Ace Your CAS-005 SecurityX Exam

Unauthorized code changesand lack ofindependent verificationare directly mitigated bycode signing, which ensures that code is from a trusted source and has not been altered.

While digital signatures are part of code signing, the broader practice of code signing encompasses signature management, version integrity, and trusted sources.

Lightweight cryptography is irrelevant in this context; it's more about efficiency in constrained devices.

Non-repudiation is a benefit of digital signatures but doesn't directly solve the verification/integrity concerns alone.

FromCAS-005 Guide, Domain 4: Security Architecture, Tools, and Technologies:

“Code signing ensures that the code has not been tampered with and originates from a trusted developer.”

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Option A: Deny list

Deny lists block specific applications or processes identified as malicious.

This approach is reactive and mayinadvertently block the non-standard applications that are currently in use without proper ownership.

Option B: Allow list

Allow lists permit only pre-approved applications to run.

While secure, this approach requires defining all non-standard applications, which may disrupt operations in an environment where ownership is unclear.

Option C: Audit mode

Correct Answer.

Audit mode allows monitoring and logging of applications without enforcing restrictions.

This is ideal in environments with non-standard applications and undefined ownership because it enables the engineer to observe the environment and gradually implement control without interruption.

Audit mode provides critical visibility into the software landscape, ensuring that necessary applications remain functional.

Option D: MAC list

Mandatory Access Control (MAC) lists restrict access based on classification and clearance levels.

This does not align with application control objectives in this context.

CompTIA CASP+ Study Guide - Chapters on Endpoint Security and Application Control.

CASP+ Objective 2.4: Implement appropriate security controls for enterprise endpoints.

The table shows that the user "SALES1" is consistently blocked despite having met the MFA requirements. The common factor in these blocked attempts is the source IP address (8.11.4.16) being identified as from Germany while the user is assigned to France. This discrepancy suggests that the network geolocation is being misidentified by the authentication server, causing legitimate access attempts to be blocked.

Why Network Geolocation Misidentification?

Geolocation Accuracy: Authentication systems often use IP geolocation to verify the location of access attempts. Incorrect geolocation data can lead to legitimate requests being denied if they appear to come from unexpected locations.

Security Policies: Company security policies might block access attempts from certain locations to prevent unauthorized access. If the geolocation is wrong, legitimate users can be inadvertently blocked.

Consistent Pattern: The user "SALES1" from the IP address 8.11.4.16 is always blocked, indicating a consistent issue with geolocation.

Other options do not align with the pattern observed:

A. Bypass MFA requirements: MFA is satisfied, so bypassing MFA is not the issue.

C. Administrator access policy: This is about user access, not specific administrator access.

D. OTP codes: The user has satisfied MFA, so OTP code configuration is not the issue.

The question focuses oninternet-facing hosts, implying external exposure. CVSS scores, remote executability, and exploitavailability guide prioritization. Server2 (205.1.3.5, CVSS 6.5, Bind Server) has a public IP, suggesting it’s internet-facing, unlike Server1 and Server4 (192.168.x.x, private IPs). Server3 (207.1.5.7, CVSS 5.5) is also public but has a lower score and risk compared to Server2’s proof-of-concept (POC) exploit. Server2’s Bind Server (DNS) role is critical and commonly targeted, making it the priority.

Option A:Server1 (CVSS 7.5) is private, not internet-facing.

Option B:Server2 (CVSS 6.5) is internet-facing with an exploit POC, warranting immediate patching.

Option C:Server3 (CVSS 5.5) is internet-facing but less severe.

Option D:Server4 (CVSS 9.8) is critical but private, not internet-facing.