DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

Accessing a secret from AWS Secrets Manager that is encrypted with a customer managed KMS key requires two distinct permission layers to succeed:

Secrets Manager permissions (via IAM) such as secretsmanager:GetSecretValue for the IAM role assumed by the Kubernetes service account.

KMS key usage permissions in the KMS key policy, allowing the same IAM principal to perform kms:Decrypt (and possibly kms:GenerateDataKey) on the customer managed key.

In this scenario, the service account assumes an IAM role explicitly created to access the secrets. The symptom is an HTTP 403 “Access Denied” when retrieving the secret. If the IAM role has Secrets Manager permissions but the call still fails, the typical root cause is that the KMS key policy does not trust or allow that IAM role, so the decrypt operation fails.

Option B correctly identifies that the KMS key policy must include the Kubernetes service account IAM role as a principal with the appropriate KMS actions.

Option A and C refer to the EKS cluster IAM role, which is not the principal making the call. Option D is unrelated: the role’s ability to “access the EKS cluster” does not affect its ability to call Secrets Manager or KMS. The missing KMS key policy permission is the underlying cause.

When you create a pipeline from CodePipeline during the step-by-step it creates a CloudWatch Event rule for a given branch and repo

like this:

{

"source": [

"aws.codecommit"

],

"detail-type": [

"CodeCommit Repository State Change"

],

"resources": [

"arn:aws:codecommit:us-east-1:xxxxx:repo-name"

],

"detail": {

"event": [

"referenceCreated",

"referenceUpdated"

],

"referenceType": [

"branch"

],

"referenceName": [

"master"

]

}

}

Comprehensive & Detailed Explanation (150–250 words):

To allow developers to create IAM users without granting excessive permissions, the correct solution is to use permissions boundaries, which AWS specifically recommends for restricting delegated administrators such as developers. A permissions boundary defines the maximum permissions that an IAM user or role can delegate.

Step C ensures that each AWS account contains a PermissionBoundaries policy defining the maximum allowed permissions that any developer-created user may receive. This prevents privilege escalation, even if the developer attaches a more powerful policy. This aligns with AWS guidance for restricting privilege escalation within multi-account environments.

Step E ensures that developers can create IAM users but only if they attach the PermissionBoundaries policy as the permissions boundary. By attaching the DeveloperBoundary policy to the CreateAndManageUsers role, developers gain the ability to create users, but they are cryptographically prevented from assigning permissions outside the boundary policy.

Meanwhile, the DevOps team (who are not restricted by the boundary) can still create IAM users with full permissions.

This combination satisfies all constraints:

DevOps team: unrestricted IAM creation

Developers: restricted IAM creation enforced by boundaries

Other users: still blocked from IAM creation by existing SCP