DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

To allow developers to create IAM users without granting excessive permissions, the correct solution is to use permissions boundaries, which AWS specifically recommends for restricting delegated administrators such as developers. A permissions boundary defines the maximum permissions that an IAM user or role can delegate.

Step C ensures that each AWS account contains a PermissionBoundaries policy defining the maximum allowed permissions that any developer-created user may receive. This prevents privilege escalation, even if the developer attaches a more powerful policy. This aligns with AWS guidance for restricting privilege escalation within multi-account environments.

Step E ensures that developers can create IAM users but only if they attach the PermissionBoundaries policy as the permissions boundary. By attaching the DeveloperBoundary policy to the CreateAndManageUsers role, developers gain the ability to create users, but they are cryptographically prevented from assigning permissions outside the boundary policy.

Meanwhile, the DevOps team (who are not restricted by the boundary) can still create IAM users with full permissions.

This combination satisfies all constraints:

DevOps team: unrestricted IAM creation

Developers: restricted IAM creation enforced by boundaries

Other users: still blocked from IAM creation by existing SCP

CodePipeline V2 with QUEUED mode ensures that new executions wait for the previous execution to finish, preventing overlapping runs.

Adding a trigger filter to listen for Git tags triggers the pipeline only on new tag pushes.

An EventBridge rule can detect new image pushes to ECR and start the deployment pipeline, integrating the build and deploy pipelines effectively.

SUPERSEDED mode cancels the previous run when a new one starts, which is not desired here.

Using branches instead of tags would trigger on all commits, not just releases.

The company requires an organization-wide, centralized, and automated solution to detect sensitive data in Amazon S3, aggregate findings in one location, and quarantine affected objects with minimal operational overhead. AWS provides a native service specifically designed for this purpose: Amazon Macie.

Option A is essential because Amazon Macie automatically discovers and classifies sensitive data such as PII in S3 buckets using managed machine learning models. When enabled at the organization level, Macie scans buckets across all accounts and Regions. Integrating Macie with AWS Security Hub centralizes all findings in a single dashboard, allowing the company’s security officer to review and manage sensitive data alerts across the organization without building custom aggregation pipelines.

Detection alone is not sufficient; remediation is also required. Option C completes the solution by using Amazon EventBridge, which natively receives Macie findings in near real time. An EventBridge rule can trigger a Lambda function whenever Macie identifies sensitive data. The Lambda function can then copy the affected object to a quarantine S3 bucket and delete the original object, meeting the remediation requirement automatically and consistently.

Option D requires custom sensitive data detection logic, which is complex, error-prone, and unnecessary given Macie’s capabilities. Option E is invalid because SCPs cannot inspect or move data. Option B does not detect sensitive information.

Therefore, A and C together provide the most efficient, scalable, and AWS-recommended solution.