Amazon Web Services DVA-C02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

Requirement Summary:

Prevent unauthorized code changes in AWS Lambda

Ensure only trusted code is deployed

AWS Lambda supports Code Signing:

You can configure code signing in Lambda using AWS Signer

Packages must be digitally signed and verified against the signing profile

Rejects unauthorized/modified packages automatically

Evaluate Options:

A. Trusted code option in CodeDeploy

No such feature exists for Lambda

CodeDeploy is more for EC2/On-Prem/Containers, not Lambda code signing

B. Define code signing config + use AWS Signer

This is exactly how AWS enforces trusted code deployment

Attach a code signing configuration to the Lambda function

Use AWS Signer to digitally sign deployment packages

C. Link to KMS to sign code

KMS is not used to sign Lambda packages

KMS is for data encryption, not application code integrity

D. Set KmsKeyArn

This configures data encryption, not code signing

Lambda code signing:

AWS Signer overview:

The requirement is application-level encryption (client-side) in addition to RDS encryption at rest, specifically to prevent database administrators from viewing PHI. Also, some PHI objects are large, so the solution must encrypt locally without size limitations.

AWS best practice for large data encryption with KMS is envelope encryption. With envelope encryption, the application generates a data encryption key (DEK) (typically obtained from KMS using GenerateDataKey). The application uses the plaintext DEK locally with a symmetric algorithm (such as AES-GCM) to encrypt the large PHI payload efficiently. The DEK itself is then protected by encrypting it with a KMS customer managed key (CMK), producing an encrypted data key that can be safely stored alongside the ciphertext. Only principals with permission to use the CMK can decrypt the DEK and then decrypt the PHI data. This ensures that even database administrators who can access the RDS data cannot read PHI without KMS authorization.

Option A is not suitable because the KMS Encrypt operation is intended for small payloads (KMS has size limits for direct encryption), making it inappropriate for large PHI files.

Option B is insecure because embedding encryption keys in source code violates key management best practices and makes rotation and compromise containment difficult.

Option C provides only storage-level encryption for the database volume; it does not ensure that PHI remains unreadable to administrators who can access the database content.

Therefore, using envelope encryption with a KMS customer managed key and storing the encrypted data key with the record is the most secure solution.

CloudWatch for Log Analysis: CloudWatch is the best fit here because logs are already centralized. Here's the process:

Metric Filter: Create a metric filter on the CloudWatch Logs log group. Design a pattern to specifically identify application error messages.

Custom Metric: This filter generates a new custom CloudWatch metric (e.g., ApplicationErrors). This metric tracks the error count.

CloudWatch Alarm: Create an alarm on the ApplicationErrors metric. Configure the alarm with your desired threshold and a 5-minute evaluation period.

SNS Action: Set the alarm to trigger an SNS notification when it enters the alarm state.