Amazon Web Services DOP-C02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

The correct answer is C.

Option A is incorrect because creating a new SCP that has two statements, one that allows access to the new range of IP addresses for all the S3 buckets and one that denies access to the old range of IP addresses for all the S3 buckets, is not a valid solution. SCPs are not resource-based policies, and they cannot specify the S3 buckets or the IP addresses as resources or conditions. SCPs can only control the actions that can be performed by the principals in the organization, not the access to specific resources. Moreover, setting a permissions boundary for the OrganizationAccountAccessRole role in the two OUs to deny access to the S3 buckets is not sufficient to revoke the permissions of the two OUs, as there might be other roles or users in those OUs that can still access the S3 buckets.

Option B is incorrect because creating a new SCP that has a statement that allows only the new range of IP addresses to access the S3 buckets is not a valid solution, for the same reason as option A. SCPs are not resource-based policies, and they cannot specify the S3 buckets or the IP addresses as resources or conditions. Creating another SCP that denies access to the S3 buckets and attaching it to the two OUs is also not a valid solution, as SCPs cannot specify the S3 buckets as resources either.

Option C is correct because it meets both requirements of changing the range of IP addresses that have permission to access the contents of the S3 buckets and revoking the permissions of two OUs in the company. On all the S3 buckets, configuring resource-based policies that allow only the new range of IP addresses to access the S3 buckets is a valid way to update the IP address ranges, as resource-based policies can specify both resources and conditions. Creating a new SCP that denies access to the S3 buckets and attaching it to the two OUs is also a valid way to revoke the permissions of those OUs, as SCPs can deny actions such as s3:PutObject or s3:GetObject on any resource.

Option D is incorrect because setting a permissions boundary for the OrganizationAccountAccessRole role in the two OUs to deny access to the S3 buckets is not sufficient to revoke the permissions of the two OUs, as there might be other roles or users in those OUs that can still access the S3 buckets. A permissions boundary is a policy that defines the maximum permissions that an IAM entity can have. However, it does not revoke any existing permissions that are granted by other policies.

Using the principalTag in the Permission Set inline policy a logged in user belonging to a specific AD group in the IDP can be permitted access to perform operations on certain resources if their group matches the group used in the PrincipleTag. Basically you are narrowing the scope of privileges assigned via Permission policies conditionally based on whether the logged in user belongs to a specific AD Group in IDP. The mapping of the AD group to the request attributes can be done using SSO attributes where we can pass other attributes like the SAML token as well.

The problem is that the DevOps engineer cannot assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account that joined AnyCompany’s management account through an Organizations invitation. The solution is to create a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy in the new member account.

Option A is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. The DevOps engineer’s IAM user already has permission to assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in any member account, as this is the default role name that AWS Organizations creates when a new account joins an organization. The error occurs because the new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations.

Option B is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. An SCP is a policy that defines the maximum permissions for account members of an organization or organizational unit (OU). An SCP does not grant permissions to IAM users or roles, but rather limits the permissions that identity-based policies or resource-based policies grant to them. An SCP also does not affect how IAM roles are assumed by other principals.

Option C is correct, as it addresses the root cause of the error. By creating a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy as the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account, the DevOps engineer can assume this role and access the account. The new role should have the AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy attached, which grants full access to all AWS resources in the account. The trust policy should allow the management account to assume the role, which can be done by specifying the management account ID as a principal in the policy statement.

Option D is incorrect, as it assumes that the new member account already has the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role, which is not true. The new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations. Editing the trust policy of a non-existent role will not solve the problem.