Amazon Web Services DOP-C02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

The requirement is to immediately detect and terminate EC2 instances involved in cryptocurrency mining with the least development effort. Amazon GuardDuty is the AWS-native service specifically designed to detect malicious activities such as crypto-mining by continuously analyzing CloudTrail events, VPC Flow Logs, and DNS logs. GuardDuty includes managed threat intelligence and predefined findings like CryptoCurrency:EC2/BitcoinTool.B!DNS and CryptoCurrency:EC2/BitcoinTool.B!IP, which directly identify mining behavior without custom detection logic.

Option C leverages this built-in capability. Once GuardDuty is enabled, findings are automatically generated when mining activity is detected. These findings are sent to Amazon EventBridge in near real time. An EventBridge rule can filter for cryptocurrency-related findings and trigger an AWS Lambda function. The Lambda function can then identify the affected EC2 instance and terminate it or adjust the Auto Scaling group to replace it. This approach requires minimal custom code and no log parsing, scheduled jobs, or analytics pipelines.

Options A and B rely on custom log analysis, periodic execution, and maintaining lists of mining domains or IPs, which significantly increases complexity and response time. Option D uses AWS Security Hub, which aggregates findings from GuardDuty and other services but is not intended for immediate, low-latency remediation.

Therefore, Option C provides the fastest detection, immediate response, and lowest development overhead using AWS-managed threat detection services.

Using an organization trail with logs centralized in the audit account’s S3 bucket ensures compliance and isolation. An EventBridge rule in the audit account triggers on failed login events (ConsoleLogin failed) and sends SNS notifications in near real time.

The question emphasizes “MOST securely” and involves a multi-account backup strategy with a centralized backup account. AWS Backup best practice for high-security environments is to use customer managed KMS keys for encrypting backup vaults rather than AWS managed keys. Customer managed keys provide tighter control over key lifecycle, key policies, and cross-account access.

Option A creates encrypted backup vaults in both the source and centralized accounts, each protected by a customer managed KMS key in that account. AWS Backup is then configured to create full EC2 backups (AMIs) and copy them to the centralized backup vault. This design ensures:

Encryption at rest in both accounts.

Independent key control and policies per account.

Secure cross-account backup copy behavior governed by explicit KMS key grants and vault access policies.

Option B incorrectly uses the source account’s KMS key to encrypt vaults in both accounts, which is not the recommended pattern; each account should manage its own CMK. Options C and D rely partially or fully on AWS managed keys, which are less appropriate when the requirement explicitly stresses maximum security and control.

Therefore, Option A best satisfies both the RPO/RTO goals (daily AMI backups with rapid restore) and the strongest encryption posture.