Free SAP-C02 Questions Attempt

The company should create an Amazon CloudFront distribution with the ALB as the origin. The company should add a custom header and random value on the CloudFront domain. The company should configure the ALB to conditionally forward traffic if the header and value match. The company should also deploy an AWS WAF web ACL that includes an appropriate rule group. The company should associate the web ACL with the Amazon CloudFront distribution. This solution will meet the requirements most cost-effectively because Amazon CloudFront is a fast content delivery network (CDN) service that securely deliversdata, videos, applications, and APIs to customers globally with lowlatency, hightransfer speeds, all within a developer-friendly environment1. By creating an Amazon CloudFront distribution with the ALB as the origin, the company can improve the performance andavailability of its application by caching static content at edge locations closer to end users. By adding a custom header and random value on the CloudFront domain, the company can prevent direct access to the ALB and ensure that only requests from CloudFront are forwarded to the ECS tasks. By configuring the ALB to conditionally forward traffic if the header and value match, the company can implement origin access identity (OAI) for its ALB origin. OAI is a feature that enables you to restrict access to your content by requiring users to access your content through CloudFront URLs2. By deploying an AWS WAF web ACL that includes an appropriate rule group, the company can prevent attacks and ensure business continuity with minimal service interruptions during an ongoing attack. AWS WAF is a web application firewall that lets you monitor and control web requests that are forwarded to your web applications. You can use AWS WAF to define customizable web security rules that control which traffic can access your web applications and which traffic should be blocked3. By associating the web ACL with the Amazon CloudFront distribution, the company can apply the web security rules to all requests that are forwarded by CloudFront.

The other options are not correct because:

Deploying the application in two AWS Regions and configuring Amazon Route 53 to route to both Regions with equal weight would not prevent attacks or ensure business continuity. Amazon Route 53 is a highly available and scalable cloud Domain Name System (DNS) web service that routes end users to Internet applications by translating names like into numeric IP addresses4. However, routing traffic to multiple Regions would not protect against attacks or provide failover in case of an outage. It would also increase operational complexity and costs compared to using CloudFront and AWS WAF.

Configuring auto scaling for Amazon ECS tasks and creating a DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX) cluster would not prevent attacks or ensure business continuity. Auto scaling is a feature that enables you to automatically adjust your ECS tasks based on demand or a schedule. DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX) is a fully managed, highly available, in-memory cache for DynamoDB that delivers up to a 10x performance improvement. However, these features would not protect against attacks or provide failover in case of an outage. They would also increase operational complexity and costs compared to using CloudFront and AWS WAF.

Configuring Amazon ElastiCache to reduce overhead on DynamoDB would not prevent attacks or ensure business continuity. Amazon ElastiCache is a fully managed in-memory data store service that makes it easy to deploy, operate, and scale popular open-source compatible in-memory data stores. However, this service would not protect against attacks or provide failover in case of an outage. It would also increase operational complexity and costs compared to using CloudFront and AWS WAF.

This explanation is based on AWS documentation and best practices but is paraphrased, not a literal extract.

The current CI/CD pipeline uses an IAM user with long-lived access keys stored in GitHub Actions. The new requirement is that pipelines must not use long-lived secret keys. Instead, the solution should provide short-lived credentials with minimal operational overhead.

GitHub Actions natively supports integration with cloud providers using OpenID Connect (OIDC). With OIDC, GitHub acts as an identity provider that can issue OIDC tokens to workflows. On the AWS side, IAM supports configuring an OIDC identity provider and roles that can be assumed by principals presenting valid OIDC tokens through the sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity API. This pattern enables short-lived, automatically rotated credentials for CI/CD jobs without storing long-lived secrets.

In the correct solution (option B), you configure an IAM OIDC identity provider for GitHub in the AWS account. You then create a new IAM role with a trust policy that allows the Github OIDC provider to call sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, with conditions that restrict which repositories or workflows can assume the role. The existing IAM policy that grants deployment permissions is attached to that role. In GitHub Actions, you update the pipeline configuration to request an OIDC token and assume the IAM role at runtime. Each workflow run receives short-lived credentials without storing static keys, and AWS automatically handles the token verification and temporary credential issuance. This approach is the AWS-recommended pattern for integrating GitHub Actions with AWS without long-lived secrets and has low operational overhead once configured.

Option A uses SAML 2.0, which is typically used for enterprise single sign-on for users, not for GitHub Actions workflows. GitHub does not natively use SAML to obtain AWS credentials for CI/CD pipelines in the same streamlined way as OIDC, and implementing a SAML-based integration would add unnecessary complexity.

Option C introduces Amazon Cognito as an indirection layer. Although Cognito can federate with external identity providers, including social providers, using it as an intermediary to obtain temporary AWS credentials for a machine-to-machine CI/CD pipeline is not necessary when IAM OIDC federation with GitHub is directly supported. This adds additional configuration and operational overhead.

Option D uses IAM Roles Anywhere with client certificates from AWS Private CA. Roles Anywhere is designed for workloads running outside AWS that need to assume IAM roles using X.509 certificates instead of access keys. While technically possible, it requires managing private certificates, trust anchors, and a credential helper tool, which is more complex and operationally heavier than the direct OIDC integration specifically designed for GitHub Actions.

Therefore, configuring an IAM OIDC identity provider for GitHub and creating an IAM role to be assumed via sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (option B) meets the requirement to replace long-lived secret keys with short-lived credentials with the least operational overhead.

B: Archiving inactive user uploads toGlacier Deep Archiveoffers the lowest storage cost.

E: Since the users are in Europe only, usingPrice Class 200reduces CloudFront delivery cost without affecting performance.

A (expiration) deletes data — not suitable.

C is invalid (App Runner does not support Spot).

D might save little unless read traffic is high.