ECCouncil 312-50v13 Online Access

OSINT-based reconnaissance includes using search engines to identify publicly exposed cloud assets. CEH highlights Google dorking as a passive method to reveal S3 buckets indexed in search engines through patterns such as site:s3.amazonaws.com or keyword-based queries.

In this scenario, users outside the organization (like Smith and Joseph on dial-up) see the defaced site, while Joseph on the internal corporate network sees the legitimate site. Tripwire confirms that the files on the actual web server are intact. This clearly indicates that the attack was not on the server itself, but rather on how external users are being directed to a malicious server.

This behavior is indicative of a DNS poisoning attack. The attacker poisoned the DNS cache of an external DNS resolver, redirecting to a malicious server. Internal DNS servers, unaffected by the poisoning, still resolved to the correct IP address.

From CEH v13:

Module 3: DNS Poisoning and Spoofing

Module 5: Vulnerability Analysis

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“DNS poisoning involves injecting false information into a DNS resolver’s cache, causing users to be redirected to malicious websites without changing the actual web server’s content.”

Incorrect Options:

A: ARP spoofing affects local network address resolution, not global DNS.

B: SQL injection is used to exploit databases, not alter DNS records.

D: Routing table injection affects traffic routes, but wouldn’t explain DNS-level redirection discrepancies.

According to the CEH Network and Perimeter Security module, one of the most effective and widely used firewall evasion techniques is the use of encrypted communication channels. When traffic is encrypted using protocols such as HTTPS, TLS, or VPN tunnels, traditional firewalls and packet-inspection tools may be unable to inspect payload contents unless SSL/TLS inspection is explicitly enabled.

CEH documentation explains that attackers commonly encrypt command-and-control (C2) traffic to:

Blend in with legitimate encrypted traffic

Bypass content-based inspection

Evade signature-based detection

Option B is therefore correct.

Option A (IP spoofing) is less effective against stateful firewalls.

Option C is a human-focused attack, not firewall evasion.

Option D has no relevance to firewall bypass techniques.

CEH highlights encryption misuse as a major blind spot in perimeter defenses.

One of the biggest problems a worm faces in achieving a very fast rate of infection is “getting off the ground.” although a worm spreads exponentially throughout the early stages of infection, the time needed to infect say the first 10,000 hosts dominates the infection time.

There is a straightforward way for an active worm a simple this obstacle, that we term hit-list scanning. Before the worm is free, the worm author collects a listing of say ten,000 to 50,000 potentially vulnerable machines, ideally ones with sensible network connections. The worm, when released onto an initial machine on this hit-list, begins scanning down the list. once it infects a machine, it divides the hit-list in half, communicating half to the recipient worm, keeping the other half.

This fast division ensures that even if only 10-20% of the machines on the hit-list are actually vulnerable, an active worm can quickly bear the hit-list and establish itself on all vulnerable machines in only some seconds. though the hit-list could begin at 200 kilobytes, it quickly shrinks to nothing during the partitioning. This provides a great benefit in constructing a quick worm by speeding the initial infection.

The hit-list needn’t be perfect: a simple list of machines running a selected server sort could serve, though larger accuracy can improve the unfold. The hit-list itself is generated victimization one or many of the following techniques, ready well before, typically with very little concern of detection.

Stealthy scans. Portscans are so common and then wide ignored that even a quick scan of the whole net would be unlikely to attract law enforcement attention or over gentle comment within the incident response community. However, for attackers wish to be particularly careful, a randomised sneaky scan taking many months would be not possible to attract much attention, as most intrusion detection systems are not currently capable of detecting such low-profile scans. Some portion of the scan would be out of date by the time it had been used, however abundant of it’d not.

Distributed scanning. an assailant might scan the web using a few dozen to some thousand already-compromised “zombies,” the same as what DDOS attackers assemble in a very fairly routine fashion. Such distributed scanning has already been seen within the wild–Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory received ten throughout the past year.

DNS searches. Assemble a list of domains (for example, by using wide offered spam mail lists, or trolling the address registries). The DNS will then be searched for the science addresses of mail-servers (via mx records) or net servers (by looking for

Spiders. For net server worms (like Code Red), use Web-crawling techniques the same as search engines so as to produce a list of most Internet-connected web sites. this would be unlikely to draw in serious attention.

Public surveys. for many potential targets there may be surveys available listing them, like the Netcraft survey.

Just listen. Some applications, like peer-to-peer networks, wind up advertising many of their servers. Similarly, many previous worms effectively broadcast that the infected machine is vulnerable to further attack. easy, because of its widespread scanning, during the Code Red I infection it was easy to select up the addresses of upwards of 300,000 vulnerable IIS servers–because each came knock on everyone’s door!