312-50v13 Leak Questions

To secure DNS infrastructure, best practices include:

B. Harden DNS Servers: Disable unused services, apply patches, implement secure configurations.

C. Use Split-Horizon DNS: Present different DNS data to internal vs. external users to prevent data leakage.

D. Restrict Zone Transfers: Prevent unauthorized replication of zone data using IP-based access control or TSIG.

E. Subnet Diversity: Place DNS servers on different subnets or networks to enhance resilience.

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 3: Scanning Networks

Module 20: Cryptography

Incorrect Option:

A: Hosting DNS on multi-purpose servers increases the attack surface and violates security best practices.

An iPhone client’s most noticeably terrible bad dream is to have somebody oversee his/her gadget, including the capacity to record and control all action without waiting be in a similar room. In this blog entry, we present another weakness called “Trustjacking”, which permits an aggressor to do precisely that.

This weakness misuses an iOS highlight called iTunes Wi-Fi sync, which permits a client to deal with their iOS gadget without genuinely interfacing it to their PC. A solitary tap by the iOS gadget proprietor when the two are associated with a similar organization permits an assailant to oversee the gadget. Furthermore, we will stroll through past related weaknesses and show the progressions that iPhone has made to alleviate them, and why these are adequately not to forestall comparative assaults.

After interfacing an iOS gadget to another PC, the clients are being found out if they trust the associated PC or not. Deciding to believe the PC permits it to speak with the iOS gadget by means of the standard iTunes APIs.

This permits the PC to get to the photographs on the gadget, perform reinforcement, introduce applications and considerably more, without requiring another affirmation from the client and with no recognizable sign. Besides, this permits enacting the “iTunes Wi-Fi sync” highlight, which makes it conceivable to proceed with this sort of correspondence with the gadget even after it has been detached from the PC, as long as the PC and the iOS gadget are associated with a similar organization. It is intriguing to take note of that empowering “iTunes Wi-Fi sync” doesn’t need the casualty’s endorsement and can be directed simply from the PC side.

Getting a live stream of the gadget’s screen should be possible effectively by consistently requesting screen captures and showing or recording them distantly.

It is imperative to take note of that other than the underlying single purpose of disappointment, approving the vindictive PC, there is no other component that forestalls this proceeded with access. Likewise, there isn’t anything that informs the clients that by approving the PC they permit admittance to their gadget even in the wake of detaching the USB link.

Implementing regular firmware updates for all IoT devices is the primary recommendation to prevent DDoS attacks on the smart city project. Firmware updates can fix security vulnerabilities, patch bugs, and improve performance of the IoT devices, making them less susceptible to malware infections and botnet recruitment12. Firmware updates can also enable new security features, such as encryption, authentication, and firewall, that can protect the IoT devices from unauthorized access and data theft3. Firmware updates should be done automatically or remotely, without requiring user intervention, to ensure timely and consistent security across the IoT network4.

The other options are not as effective or feasible as firmware updates for the following reasons:

B. Deploying network intrusion detection systems (IDS) across the IoT network can help detect and alert DDoS attacks, but not prevent them. IDS can monitor network traffic and identify malicious patterns, such as high volume, spoofed IP addresses, or unusual protocols, that indicate a DDoS attack5. However, IDS cannot block or mitigate the attack, and may even be overwhelmed by the flood of traffic, resulting in false positives or missed alerts. Moreover, deploying IDS across a vast network of IoT devices can be costly, complex, and resource-intensive, as it requires dedicated hardware, software, and personnel.

C. Establishing strong, unique passwords for each IoT device can prevent unauthorized access and brute-force attacks, but not DDoS attacks. Passwords can protect the IoT devices from being compromised by hackers who try to guess or crack the default or weak credentials. However, passwords cannot prevent DDoS attacks that exploit known or unknown vulnerabilities in the IoT devices, such as buffer overflows, command injections, or protocol flaws. Moreover, establishing and managing strong, unique passwords for each IoT device can be challenging and impractical, as it requires user awareness, memory, and effort.

D. Implementing IP address whitelisting for all IoT devices can restrict network access and communication to trusted sources, but not DDoS attacks. IP address whitelisting can filter out unwanted or malicious traffic by allowing only the predefined IP addresses to connect to the IoT devices. However, IP address whitelisting cannot prevent DDoS attacks that use spoofed or legitimate IP addresses, such as reflection or amplification attacks, that bypass the whitelisting rules. Moreover, implementing IP address whitelisting for all IoT devices can be difficult and risky, as it requires constant updating, testing, and monitoring of the whitelist, and may block legitimate or emergency traffic by mistake.

The AndroidManifest.xml file contains information of your package, including components of the appliance like activities, services, broadcast receivers, content providers etc.

It performs another tasks also:

• it’s responsible to guard the appliance to access any protected parts by providing the permissions.

• It also declares the android api that the appliance goes to use.

• It lists the instrumentation classes. The instrumentation classes provides profiling and other informations. These informations are removed just before the appliance is published etc.

This is the specified xml file for all the android application and located inside the basis directory.