CEH v13 312-50v13 Reddit Questions

The most effective evasion technique to bypass the IDS signature detection while performing a SQL Injection attack is to leverage string concatenation to break identifiable keywords. This technique involves splitting SQL keywords or operators into smaller parts and joining them with string concatenation operators, such as ‘+’ or ‘||’. This way, the SQL query can still be executed by the database engine, but the IDS cannot recognize the keywords or operators as malicious, as they are hidden within strings. For example, the hacker could replace the keyword ‘OR’ with ‘O’||‘R’ or ‘O’+‘R’ in the SQL query, and the IDS would not be able to match the signature of a typical SQL injection pattern12.

The other options are not as effective as option D for the following reasons:

A. Implement case variation by altering the case of SQL statements: This option is not effective because most SQL engines and IDS systems are case-insensitive, meaning that they treat SQL keywords and operators the same regardless of their case. Therefore, altering the case of SQL statements would not help evade the IDS signature detection, as the IDS would still be able to match the signature of a typical SQL injection pattern3.

B. Employ IP fragmentation to obscure the attack payload: This option is not applicable because IP fragmentation is a network-level technique that splits IP packets into smaller fragments to fit the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the network. IP fragmentation does not affect the content or structure of the SQL query, and it does not help evade the IDS signature detection, as the IDS would still be able to reassemble the fragments and match the signature of a typical SQL injection pattern4.

C. Use Hex encoding to represent the SQL query string: This option is not feasible because Hex encoding is a method of representing binary data in hexadecimal format, such as ‘0x41’ for ‘A’. Hex encoding does not work for SQL queries, as the SQL engine would not be able to interpret the hexadecimal values as valid SQL syntax. Moreover, Hex encoding would not help evade the IDS signature detection, as the IDS would still be able to decode the hexadecimal values and match the signature of a typical SQL injection pattern.

CEH v13 emphasizes that insecure deserialization is one of the most dangerous application vulnerabilities because it can lead to arbitrary code execution, bypassing authentication, authorization, and session protections entirely.

Even with MFA, encrypted cookies, and WAFs, deserialization flaws allow attackers to manipulate serialized objects used in session handling. When deserialized without validation, these objects may execute attacker-controlled code.

CSRF relies on authenticated users. Side jacking is mitigated by encryption. Session fixation is ineffective if session regeneration and MFA are implemented. Insecure deserialization, however, attacks the application logic itself, making it the most effective option.

Thus, Option D is correct.

In CEH v13 Module 14: Cryptography, key escrow is discussed as a recovery mechanism where a third party securely holds a cryptographic key for retrieval if it’s lost.

Key Escrow Characteristics:

Common in enterprise environments for systems like BitLocker.

Keys are automatically backed up to Active Directory (AD) for future retrieval.

Ensures that encrypted data is not permanently lost due to forgotten or deleted keys.

Option Clarification:

A. Key archival: Storing old keys for audit/record-keeping.

B. Key escrow: Correct – Third-party or central storage for recovery purposes.

C. Certificate rollover: Replacement of expiring certificates.

D. Key renewal: Generating a new key after expiration or compromise.

CEH cloud security modules highlight that Azure Managed Identities allow workloads such as functions, VMs, and automation tasks to authenticate to Azure resources without storing secrets. If an attacker obtains the token associated with a managed identity, they can impersonate that identity and access any Azure resources it is permitted to use. In this scenario, the captured access token is used to authenticate via Azure PowerShell and retrieve storage account keys, demonstrating unauthorized privilege usage by hijacking the managed identity. This aligns directly with managed identity abuse, where attackers leverage identity tokens instead of user credentials. NSG rule gathering and AzureGraph enumeration are reconnaissance activities, and Stormspotter is used for visualizing attack paths, not abusing identities. Therefore, this scenario clearly illustrates exploitation of managed identities.