Amazon Web Services SCS-C02 Dumps

Enabling AWS CloudTrail with a trail applied to all regions and specifying a single S3 bucket for storage is the simplest method to record and retain API call activity for security analysis. This configuration ensures comprehensive coverage across all current and future AWS regions, centralizing log collection and simplification of log management.

this is the simplest change that can address the server issue. CloudFront is a service that provides a global network of edge locations that cache and deliver web content. Creating a CloudFront distribution and configuring the ALB as the origin can help reduce the load on the Tomcat server by serving cached content to the end users. CloudFront can also provide protection against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks by filtering malicious traffic at the edge locations. The other options are either ineffective or complex for solving the server issue.

The condition of "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"IAM:kms" ensures that objects uploaded need to be encrypted.

Options B,C and D are invalid because you have to ensure the condition of ns3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"IAM:kms" is present

For more information on IAM KMS best practices, just browse to the below URL:

IAMstatic.com/whitepapers/IAM-kms-best-praaices.pdf

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A bucket policy is a resource-based policy that defines permissions for a specific S3 bucket. It can be used to grant cross-account access to another AWS account or an IAM user or role in another account. A bucket policy can also specify which actions, resources, and conditions are allowed or denied.

A bucket ACL is an access control list that grants basic read or write permissions to predefined groups of users. It cannot be used to grant cross-account access to a specific IAM user or role in another account.

An object ACL is an access control list that grants basic read or write permissions to predefined groups of users for a specific object in an S3 bucket. It cannot be used to grant cross-account access to a specific IAM user or role in another account.

A user policy is an IAM policy that defines permissions for an IAM user or role in the same account. It cannot be used to grant cross-account access to another AWS account or an IAM user or role in another account.

For more information, see Provide cross-account access to objects in Amazon S3 buckets and Example 2: Bucket owner granting cross-account bucket permissions.

The correct answer is C. Edit the existing trail in the Organizations management account and apply it to the organization.

The reason is that this is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that there is at least one trail configured for all existing accounts and for any account that is created in the future. According to the AWS documentation1, “If you have created an organization in AWS Organizations, you can create a trail that logs all events for all AWS accounts in that organization. This is sometimes called an organization trail.” The documentation1 also states that “The management account for the organization can edit an existing trail in their account, and apply it to an organization, making it an organization trail. Organization trails log events for the management account and all member accounts in the organization.” Therefore, by editing the existing trail in the management account and applying it to the organization, the security team can ensure that all accounts are sending CloudTrail logs to a centralized S3 logging bucket.

The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Create a new trail and configure it to send CloudTrail logs to Amazon S3. Use Amazon EventBridge to send notification if a trail is deleted or stopped. This option is not sufficient to ensure that there is at least one trail configured for all accounts, because it does not prevent users from deleting or stopping the trail in their accounts. Even if EventBridge sends a notification, the security team would have to manually restore or restart the trail, which is not efficient or scalable.
• B. Deploy an AWS Lambda function in every account to check if there is an existing trail and create a new trail, if needed. This option is not optimal because it requires deploying and maintaining a Lambda function in every account, which adds complexity and cost. Moreover, it does not prevent users from deleting or stopping the trail after it is created by the Lambda function.
• D. Create an SCP to deny the cloudtrail:Delete and cloudtrail:Stop actions. Apply the SCP to all accounts. This option is not sufficient to ensure that there is at least one trail configured for all accounts, because it does not create or apply a trail in the first place. It only prevents users from deleting or stopping an existing trail, but it does not guarantee that a trail exists in every account.

To protect the sensitive data against any data breach and minimize management overhead, the security engineer should recommend the following solution:

• Enable Amazon RDS encryption to encrypt the database and snapshots. This allows the security engineer to use AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) to encrypt data at rest for the database and any backups or replicas.
• Enable Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) encryption on Amazon EC2 instances. This allows the security engineer to use AWS KMS to encrypt data at rest for the EC2 instances and any snapshots or volumes.
• Store the database credentials in AWS Secrets Manager with automatic rotation. This allows the security engineer to encrypt and manage secrets centrally, and to configure automatic rotation schedules for them.
• Set up TLS for the connection to the RDS hosted database. This allows the security engineer to encrypt data in transit between the EC2 instances and the database.

To ensure minimal latency and regional availability of secrets, encrypting secrets in us-east-1 with a customer-managed KMS key and then replicating them to us-west-1 for encryption with the same key is the optimal approach. This method leverages customer-managed KMS keys for enhanced control and ensures that secrets are available in both regions, adhering to disaster recovery principles and minimizing latency by using regional endpoints.

To ensure that the EC2 instances are logged, the security engineer should do the following:

• Use AWS DNS resolvers for all EC2 instances. This allows the security engineer to use Amazon-provided DNS servers that resolve public DNS hostnames to private IP addresses within their VPC, and that log DNS queries in Amazon CloudWatch Logs.

The key length for an RSA certificate that you use with CloudFront is 2048 bits, even though ACM supports larger keys. If you use an imported certificate with CloudFront, your key length must be 1024 or 2048 bits and cannot exceed 2048 bits. You must import the certificate in the US East (N. Virginia) Region. You must have permission to use and import the SSL/TLS certificate

The below diagram from an IAM blog shows how security groups can be monitored

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Option A is invalid because you need to use Cloudwatch Events to check for chan,

Option B is invalid because you need to use Cloudwatch Events to check for chang

Option C is invalid because IAM inspector is not used to monitor the activity on Security Groups

For more information on monitoring security groups, please visit the below URL:

Ihttpsy/IAM.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-automatically-revert-and-receive-notifications-about-changes-to-your-amazonj 'pc-security-groups/

The correct answer is: Use Cloudwatch events to be triggered for any changes to the Security Groups. Configure the Lambda function for email notification as well.

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The correct answer is C. Use AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM) to share Account-A’s VPC subnets with the remaining member accounts. Configure the member accounts to use the shared subnets to launch workloads.

This answer is correct because AWS RAM is a service that helps you securely share your AWS resources across AWS accounts, within your organization or organizational units (OUs), and with IAM roles and users for supported resource types1. One of the supported resource types is VPC subnets2, which means you can share the subnets in Account-A’s VPC with the other member accounts using AWS RAM. This way, you can meet the requirements of using a centrally managed VPC, avoiding duplicate VPCs in each account, and launching workloads in shared subnets. You can also control the access to the shared subnets by using IAM policies and resource-based policies3, which can prevent one account from modifying another account’s resources.

The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Using a CloudFormation template in the member accounts to launch workloads and using the Fn::ImportValue function to obtain the subnet ID values is not a solution, because Fn::ImportValue can only import values that have been exported by another stack within the same region4. This means that you cannot use Fn::ImportValue to reference the subnet IDs that are exported by Account-A’s CloudFormation template, unless all the member accounts are in the same region as Account-A. This option also does not avoid creating duplicate VPCs in each account, which is one of the requirements.
• B. Using a transit gateway in the VPC within Account-A and configuring the member accounts to use the transit gateway to access the subnets in Account-A to launch workloads is not a solution, because a transit gateway does not allow you to launch workloads in another account’s subnets. A transit gateway is a network transit hub that enables you to route traffic between your VPCs and on-premises networks5, but it does not enable you to share subnets across accounts.
• D. Creating a peering connection between Account-A and the remaining member accounts and configuring the member accounts to use the subnets in Account-A through the VPC peering connection to launch workloads is not a solution, because a VPC peering connection does not allow you to launch workloads in another account’s subnets. A VPC peering connection is a networking connection between two VPCs that enables you to route traffic between them privately6, but it does not enable you to share subnets across accounts.

References:

1: What is AWS Resource Access Manager? 2: Shareable AWS resources 3: Managing permissions for shared resources 4: Fn::ImportValue 5: What is a transit gateway? 6: What is VPC peering?

e-clusters/#:~:text=In%20the%20navigation%20pane%2C%20in,subnet%20ID%20for%20your%20CloudHSM.

This solution meets the requirement of receiving an email notification about critical findings in AWS Security Hub. Amazon EventBridge is a serverless event bus that can receive events from AWS services and third-party sources, and route them to targets based on rules and filters. Amazon SNS is a fully managed pub/sub service that can send messages to various endpoints, such as email, SMS, mobile push, and HTTP. By creating an EventBridge rule that detects critical Security Hub findings and sends them to an SNS topic, the company can leverage the existing integration between these services and avoid writing custom code or managing servers. By subscribing an email endpoint to the SNS topic, the company can receive published messages in their inbox.

To address the issue of an Amazon EC2 instance receiving suspicious requests over an open TCP port, the most effective solution is to update the Network Access Control List (NACL) associated with the subnet where the EC2 instance resides. By adding a deny rule for the specific TCP port and source IP addresses involved in the suspicious activity, the security team can effectively block unwanted traffic at the subnet level. NACLs act as a stateless firewall for controlling traffic in and out of subnets, allowing for broad-based traffic filtering. This measure ensures that only legitimate traffic can reach the EC2 instance, thereby enhancing security without affecting the application's availability to other users. It's a more granular and immediate way to block specific traffic compared to modifying security group rules, which are stateful and apply at the instance level.

You can use IAM CloudTrail to get a history of IAM API calls and related events for your account. This history includes calls made with the IAM Management Console, IAM Command Line Interface, IAM SDKs, and other IAM services.

Options A,B and D are invalid because you need to ensure that you use the services of CloudTrail, IAM Config, IAM Credential Reports

For more information on Cloudtrail, please visit the below URL:

IAM Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit and evaluate the configurations of your IAM resources. Config continuously monitors and records your IAM resource configurations and allows you to automate the evaluation of recorded configurations against desired configurations. With Config, you can review changes in configurations and relationships between IAM resources, dive into detailed resource configuration histories, and determine your overall compliance against the configurations specified in your internal guidelines. This enables you to simplify compliance auditing, security analysis, char management and operational troubleshooting.

For more information on the config service, please visit the below URL

You can generate and download a credential report that lists all users in your account and the status of their various credentials, including passwords, access keys, and MFA devices. You can get a credential report from the IAM Management Console, the IAM SDKs and Command Line Tools, or the IAM API.

For more information on Credentials Report, please visit the below URL:

credentials_getting-report.html

The correct answer is: CloudTrail, IAM Config, IAM Credential Reports Submit your Feedback/Queries to our Experts

This answer is correct because AWS Shield Advanced is a service that provides comprehensive protection against DDoS attacks of any size or duration. It also provides metrics and reports on the DDoS attack vectors, duration, and size. You can create an Amazon CloudWatch alarm that monitors Shield Advanced metrics such as DDoSAttackBitsPerSecond, DDoSAttackPacketsPerSecond, and DDoSAttackRequestsPerSecond to receive alerts if a DDoS attack occurs against your account.

For more information, see Monitoring AWS Shield Advanced with Amazon CloudWatch and AWS Shield Advanced metrics and alarms.

To get objects from an S3 bucket that are encrypted with a KMS customer managed key, the security team needs to have the following factors in place:

• The IAM instance profile that is attached to the EC2 instance must allow the s3:GetObject action to the S3 bucket or object in the AWS account. This permission is required to read the object from S3. Option A is incorrect because it specifies the s3:ListBucket action, which is only required to list the objects in the bucket, not to get them.
• The KMS key policy that encrypts the object in the S3 bucket must allow the kms:Decrypt action to the EC2 instance profile ARN. This permission is required to decrypt the object using the KMS key. Option D is correct.
• The security group that is attached to the EC2 instance must have an outbound rule to the S3 managed prefix list over port 443. This rule is required to allow HTTPS traffic from the EC2 instance to S3 within the AWS infrastructure. Option E is correct. Option B is incorrect because it specifies the s3:ListParts action, which is only required for multipart uploads, not for getting objects. Option C is incorrect because it specifies the kms:ListKeys action, which is not required for getting objects. Option F is incorrect because it specifies an inbound rule from the S3 managed prefix list, which is not required for getting objects. Verified References:
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/UsingKMSEncryption.html
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/control-access.html
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/vpc-endpoints-s3.html

The correct answer is A. Revoke all versions of the signing profile assigned to the developer.

According to the AWS documentation1, AWS Signer is a fully managed code-signing service that helps you ensure the trust and integrity of your code. You can use Signer to sign code artifacts, such as Lambda deployment packages, with code-signing certificates that you control and manage.

A signing profile is a collection of settings that Signer uses to sign your code artifacts. A signing profile includes information such as the following:

• The type of signature that you want to create (for example, a code-signing signature).
• The signing algorithm that you want Signer to use to sign your code.
• The code-signing certificate and its private key that you want Signer to use to sign your code.

You can create multiple versions of a signing profile, each with a different code-signing certificate. You can also revoke a version of a signing profile if you no longer want to use it for signing code artifacts.

In this case, the company wants to ensure that all the code that the developer wrote can no longer be deployed to the Lambda functions. One way to achieve this is to revoke all versions of the signing profile that was assigned to the developer. This will prevent Signer from using that signing profile to sign any new code artifacts, and also invalidate any existing signatures that were created with that signing profile. This way, the company can ensure that only trusted and authorized code can be deployed to the Lambda functions.

The other options are incorrect because:

• B. Examining the developer’s IAM roles and removing all permissions that grant access to Signer may not be sufficient to prevent the deployment of the developer’s code. The developer may have already signed some code artifacts with a valid signing profile before leaving the company, and those signatures may still be accepted by Lambda unless the signing profile is revoked.
• C. Re-encrypting all source code with a new AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key may not be effective or practical. AWS KMS is a service that lets you create and manage encryption keys for your data. However, Lambda does not require encryption keys for deploying code artifacts, only valid signatures from Signer. Therefore, re-encrypting the source code may not prevent the deployment of the developer’s code if it has already been signed with a valid signing profile. Moreover, re-encrypting all source code may be time-consuming and disruptive for other developers who are working on the same code base.
• D. Using Amazon CodeGuru to profile all the code that the Lambda functions use may not help with preventing the deployment of the developer’s code. Amazon CodeGuru is a service that provides intelligent recommendations to improve your code quality and identify an application’s most expensive lines of code. However, CodeGuru does not perform any security checks or validations on your code artifacts, nor does it interact with Signer or Lambda in any way. Therefore, using CodeGuru may not prevent unauthorized or untrusted code from being deployed to the Lambda functions.

References:

1: What is AWS Signer? - AWS Signer

To resolve CloudTrail's failure to deliver events to S3, verifying the S3 bucket policy for CloudTrail's write permissions (A) and ensuring the existence of the specified S3 bucket (D) are critical initial steps. These actions ensure that CloudTrail has the necessary permissions and a valid destination for log file delivery, addressing common configuration issues that can interrupt event logging.

The correct combination of conditions to add to the IAM policy is A and C. These conditions will ensure that IAM users must use MFA to access certain services in the AWS production account, and that each session will expire after 2 hours.

• Option A: “Bool” : { “aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent” : “true” } is a valid condition that checks if the principal (the IAM user) has authenticated with MFA before making the request. This condition will enforce MFA for the IAM users to access the specified services. This condition key is supported by all AWS services that support IAM policies1.
• Option B: “Bool” : { “aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent” : “false” } is the opposite of option A. This condition will allow access only if the principal has not authenticated with MFA, which is not the desired requirement. This condition key is supported by all AWS services that support IAM policies1.
• Option C: “NumericLessThan” : { “aws:MultiFactorAuthAge” : “7200” } is a valid condition that checks if the time since the principal authenticated with MFA is less than 7200 seconds (2 hours). This condition will enforce the session duration limit for the IAM users. This condition key is supported by all AWS services that support IAM policies1.
• Option D: “NumericGreaterThan” : { “aws:MultiFactorAuthAge” : “7200” } is the opposite of option C. This condition will allow access only if the time since the principal authenticated with MFA is more than 7200 seconds (2 hours), which is not the desired requirement. This condition key is supported by all AWS services that support IAM policies1.
• Option E: “NumericLessThan” : { “MaxSessionDuration” : “7200” } is not a valid condition key. MaxSessionDuration is a property of an IAM role, not a condition key. It specifies the maximum session duration (in seconds) for the role, which can be between 3600 and 43200 seconds (1 to 12 hours). This property can be set when creating or modifying a role, but it cannot be used as a condition in a policy2.

The correct answer is C. Configure Route 53 Resolver query logging on all relevant VPCs. Send the logs to Amazon CloudWatch Logs. Use CloudWatch Insights to run queries on the source IP address and DNS name.

According to the AWS documentation1, Route 53 Resolver query logging lets you log the DNS queries that Route 53 Resolver handles for your VPCs. You can send the logs to CloudWatch Logs, Amazon S3, or Kinesis Data Firehose. The logs include information such as the following:

• The AWS Region where the VPC was created
• The ID of the VPC that the query originated from
• The IP address of the instance that the query originated from
• The instance ID of the resource that the query originated from
• The date and time that the query was first made
• The DNS name requested (such as prod.example.com)
• The DNS record type (such as A or AAAA)
• The DNS response code, such as NoError or ServFail
• The DNS response data, such as the IP address that is returned in response to the DNS query

You can use CloudWatch Insights to run queries on your log data and analyze the results using graphs and statistics2. You can filter and aggregate the log data based on any field, and use operators and functions to perform calculations and transformations. For example, you can use CloudWatch Insights to find out how many queries were made for a specific domain name, or which instances made the most queries.

Therefore, this solution meets the requirements of logging and querying DNS traffic that goes to the on-premises DNS servers, showing details of the source IP address of the instance from which the query originated, and the DNS name that was requested in Route 53 Resolver.

The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Using VPC Traffic Mirroring would not capture the DNS queries that go to the on-premises DNS servers, because Traffic Mirroring only copies network traffic from an elastic network interface of an EC2 instance to a target for analysis3. Traffic Mirroring does not include traffic that goes through a Route 53 Resolver outbound endpoint, which is used to forward queries to on-premises DNS servers4. Therefore, this solution would not meet the requirements.
• B. Configuring VPC flow logs on all relevant VPCs would not capture the DNS name that was requested in Route 53 Resolver, because flow logs only record information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in a VPC5. Flow logs do not include any information about the content or payload of a packet, such as a DNS query or response. Therefore, this solution would not meet the requirements.
• D. Modifying the Route 53 Resolver rules on the authoritative domains that forward to the on-premises DNS servers would not enable logging of DNS queries, because Resolver rules only specify how to forward queries for specified domain names to your network6. Resolver rules do not have any logging functionality by themselves. Therefore, this solution would not meet the requirements.

References:

1: Resolver query logging - Amazon Route 53 2: Analyzing log data with CloudWatch Logs Insights - Amazon CloudWatch 3: What is Traffic Mirroring? - Amazon Virtual Private Cloud 4: Outbound Resolver endpoints - Amazon Route 53 5: Logging IP traffic using VPC Flow Logs - Amazon Virtual Private Cloud 6: Managing forwarding rules - Amazon Route 53

because this is a solution that can monitor each S3 bucket for unrestricted public write access and use IAM managed services. S3 is a service that provides object storage in the cloud. Systems Manager is a service that helps you automate and manage your AWS resources. You can use Systems Manager to monitor S3 bucket policies for public write access by using a State Manager association that runs a predefined document called AWS-FindS3BucketWithPublicWriteAccess. This document checks each S3 bucket in an account and reports any bucket that has public write access enabled. The other options are either not suitable or not feasible for meeting the requirements.

IAM Direct Connect makes it easy to establish a dedicated network connection from your premises to IAM. Using IAM Direct Connect you can establish private connectivity between IAM and your datacenter, office, or colocation environment which in many cases can reduce your network costs, increase bandwidth throughput and provide a more consistent network experience than Internet-based connections.

Options B and C are invalid because these options will not reduce network latency

Options D is invalid because this is only used to connect 2 VPC's

For more information on IAM direct connect, just browse to the below URL:

The correct answer is: Provision a Direct Connect connection to an IAM region using a Direct Connect partner. omit your Feedback/Queries to our Experts

Open the AWS Systems Manager console at In the navigation pane, choose Session Manager. Choose the Preferences tab, and then choose Edit. Select the check box next to Enable under S3 logging. (Recommended) Select the check box next to Allow only encrypted S3 buckets. With this option turned on, log data is encrypted using the server-side encryption key specified for the bucket. If you don 't want to encrypt the log data that is sent to Amazon S3, clear the check box. You must also clear the check box if encryption isn't allowed on the S3 bucket.

 these are the strategies that can reduce the attack surface and enhance the security of the containers. Containers are a method of packaging and running applications in isolated environments. Using containers to automate security deployments can help ensure that security patches and updates are applied consistently and quickly across the container fleet. Segregating containers by host, function, and data classification can help limit the impact of a compromise and enforce the principle of least privilege. The other options are either irrelevant or risky for securing containers.

To securely and cost-effectively retain log data archives for several years, the company should do the following:

• Archive the data to Amazon S3 Glacier and apply a Vault Lock policy. This allows the company to use a low-cost storage class that is designed for long-term archival of data that is rarely accessed. It also allows the company to enforce compliance controls on their S3 Glacier vault by locking a vault access policy that cannot be changed.

The AWS documentation states that you can deploy the Lambda functions inside the VPC and attach a security group to the Lambda functions. You can then provide outbound rule access to the VPC CIDR range only and update the DB instance security group to allow traffic from the Lambda security group. This method is the most secure way to meet the requirements.

References: : AWS Lambda Developer Guide

AWS Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit, and evaluate the configurations of your AWS resources. AWS Config continuously monitors and records your AWS resource configurations and allows you to automate the evaluation of recorded configurations against desired configurations.

To evaluate configuration changes to a specific AWS resource and ensure that it meets compliance standards, the security engineer should use AWS Config to detect the configuration changes and to record the latest configuration in case of multiple configuration changes. This will allow the security engineer to view the current state of the resource and its compliance status, as well as its configuration history and timeline.

AWS Config records configuration changes as ConfigurationItems, which are point-in-time snapshots of the resource’s attributes, relationships, and metadata. If multiple configuration changes occur within a short period of time, AWS Config records only the latest ConfigurationItem for that resource. This indicates the cumulative impact of the set of changes on the resource’s configuration.

This solution will meet the requirement in the most operationally efficient way, as it leverages AWS Config’s features to monitor, record, and evaluate resource configurations without requiring additional tools or services.

The other options are incorrect because they either do not record the latest configuration in case of multiple configuration changes (A, C), or do not use a valid service for evaluating resource configurations (D).

Verified References:

• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/WhatIsConfig.html
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/config-item-table.html

To redesign the edge security to help mitigate the DDoS attack risk in the future, the engineer could do the following:

• Move the static content to Amazon S3, and front this with an Amazon CloudFront distribution. This allows the engineer to use a global content delivery network that can cache static content at edge locations and reduce the load on the origin servers.
• Use AWS WAF security rules to inspect the inbound traffic. This allows the engineer to use web application firewall rules that can filter malicious requests based on IP addresses, headers, body, or URI strings, and block them before they reach the web servers.
• Use Amazon Route 53 to distribute traffic. This allows the engineer to use a scalable and highly available DNS service that can route traffic based on different policies, such as latency, geolocation, or health checks.

To set up a CloudFront distribution for an S3 bucket that hosts a static website, and to allow only specified IP addresses to access the website, the following steps are required:

• Create a CloudFront origin access identity (OAI), which is a special CloudFront user that you can associate with your distribution. An OAI allows you to restrict access to your S3 content by using signed URLs or signed cookies. For more information, see Using an origin access identity to restrict access to your Amazon S3 content.
• Create the S3 bucket policy so that only the OAI has access. This will prevent users from accessing the website directly by using S3 URLs, as they will receive an Access Denied error. To do this, use the AWS Policy Generator to create a bucket policy that grants s3:GetObject permission to the OAI, and attach it to the S3 bucket. For more information, see Restricting access to Amazon S3 content by using an origin access identity.
• Create an AWS WAF web ACL and add an IP set rule. AWS WAF is a web application firewall service that lets you control access to your web applications. An IP set is a condition that specifies a list of IP addresses or IP address ranges that requests originate from. You can use an IP set rule to allow or block requests based on the IP addresses of the requesters. For more information, see Working with IP match conditions.
• Associate the web ACL with the CloudFront distribution. This will ensure that the web ACL filters all requests for your website before they reach your origin. You can do this by using the AWS WAF console, API, or CLI. For more information, see Associating or disassociating a web ACL with a CloudFront distribution.

This solution will meet the requirements of allowing only specified IP addresses to access the website and preventing direct access by using S3 URLs.

The other options are incorrect because they either do not create a CloudFront distribution for the S3 bucket (A), do not use an OAI to restrict access to the S3 bucket ©, or do not use AWS WAF to block traffic from outside the specified IP addresses (D).

Verified References:

• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/private-content-restricting-access-to-s3.html
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/web-acl-ip-conditions.html

This answer is correct because downloading the updated SAML metadata file from the identity service provider ensures that AWS has the latest information about the identity provider, including the new public key. Updating the file in the AWS identity provider entity defined in IAM by using the AWS CLI allows AWS to verify the signature of the SAML assertions sent by the identity provider. This solution also minimizes operational overhead because it can be automated with a script or a cron job.

n.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/troubleshooting-launch.html#troubleshooting-launch-internal

To implement the solution, the security engineer should do the following:

• Assign an Elastic IP address to Amazon EFS and add the Elastic IP address to the allow list for the data center firewall. This allows the security engineer to use a specific IP address for the EFS file system that can be added to the firewall rules, instead of a CIDR range or a URL.
• Install the AWS CLI on the data center-based servers to mount the EFS file system. This allows the security engineer to use the mount helper provided by AWS CLI to mount the EFS file system with encryption in transit.
• In the EFS security group, add the IP addresses of the data center servers to the allow list. This allows the security engineer to restrict access to the EFS file system to only certain data center-based servers.
• Mount the EFS using the Elastic IP address. This allows the security engineer to use the Elastic IP address as the DNS name for mounting the EFS file system.

Note that the IP is known and the question wants us to deny access from that particular address and so we can use IP set match policy of WAF to block access.

To meet the requirements of storing scanned copies of customer receipts on Amazon S3, where files will be between 100 KB and 5 MB in PDF format, each retail store must have a unique encryption key, and each object must be encrypted with a unique key, the most appropriate solution would be to create a dedicated AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) customer managed key for each retail store. Then, use the S3 Put operation to upload the objects to Amazon S3, specifying server-side encryption with AWS KMS keys (SSE-KMS) and the key ID of the store’s key.

References: : Amazon S3 - Amazon Web Services : AWS Key Management Service - Amazon Web Services : Amazon S3 - Amazon Web Services : AWS Key Management Service - Amazon Web Services

Establishing a VPC peering connection between the VPCs in Account A and Account B and updating route tables, network ACLs, and security groups to permit the necessary traffic ensures private connectivity for the application to write to the S3 bucket without traversing the public internet. This solution is efficient and maintains network security and integrity.

To configure end-to-end encryption between the Elastic Load Balancer and the EC2 instances with the least operational effort, the most appropriate solution would be to use Amazon issued AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) certificates on the EC2 instances and the Elastic Load Balancer to configure end-to-end encryption.

 AWS Certificate Manager - Amazon Web Services : Elastic Load Balancing - Amazon Web Services : Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud - Amazon Web Services : AWS Certificate Manager - Amazon Web Services

The combination of solutions that will meet the requirements are:

• A. Create a local individual break glass IAM user for the security team. Create a trail in AWS CloudTrail that has Amazon CloudWatch Logs turned on. Use Amazon EventBridge to monitor local user activities. This is a valid solution because it allows the security team to access the workload AWS account and instances using a local IAM user that does not depend on SAML federation. It also enables logging and monitoring of the break glass user activities using AWS CloudTrail, Amazon CloudWatch Logs, and Amazon EventBridge123.
• E. Configure AWS Systems Manager Session Manager for Amazon EC2. Configure an AWS CloudTrail filter based on Session Manager. Send the results to an Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) topic. This is a valid solution because it allows the security team to access the workload instances without opening any inbound ports or managing SSH keys or bastion hosts. It also enables logging and notification of the break glass user activities using AWS CloudTrail, Session Manager, and Amazon SNS456.

The other options are incorrect because:

• B. Creating a break glass EC2 key pair for the AWS account and providing it to the security team is not a valid solution, because it requires opening inbound ports on the instances and managing SSH keys, which increases the security risk and complexity7.
• C. Creating a break glass IAM role for the account and allowing security team members to perform the AssumeRoleWithSAML operation is not a valid solution, because it still depends on SAML federation, which might not work in case of SAML errors8.
• D. Creating a local individual break glass IAM user on the operating system level of each workload instance and configuring unrestricted security groups on the instances to grant access to the break glass IAM users is not a valid solution, because it requires opening inbound ports on the instances and managing multiple local users, which increases the security risk and complexity9.

References:

1: Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account 2: Creating a Trail - AWS CloudTrail 3: Using Amazon EventBridge with AWS CloudTrail 4: Setting up Session Manager - AWS Systems Manager 5: Logging Session Manager sessions - AWS Systems Manager 6: Amazon Simple Notification Service 7: Connecting to your Linux instance using SSH - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 8: AssumeRoleWithSAML - AWS Security Token Service 9: IAM Users - AWS Identity and Access Management

The correct answer is C. The GuardDuty integration with Security Hub was never activated in the AWS account where the finding was generated.

According to the AWS documentation1, GuardDuty findings are automatically sent to Security Hub only if the GuardDuty integration with Security Hub is enabled in the same account and Region. This means that the security tooling account, which is the delegated administrator for both GuardDuty and Security Hub, must enable the GuardDuty integration with Security Hub in each member account and Region where GuardDuty is enabled. Otherwise, the findings from GuardDuty will not be visible in Security Hub.

The other options are incorrect because:

• VPC flow logs are not required for GuardDuty to generate DNS findings. GuardDuty uses VPC DNS logs, which are automatically enabled for all VPCs, to detect malicious or unauthorized DNS activity.
• The DHCP option configured for a custom OpenDNS resolver does not affect GuardDuty’s ability to generate DNS findings. GuardDuty uses its own threat intelligence sources to identify malicious domains, regardless of the DNS resolver used by the EC2 instance.
• Cross-Region aggregation in Security Hub is not relevant for this scenario, because the company operates out of a single AWS Region. Cross-Region aggregation allows Security Hub to aggregate findings from multiple Regions into a single Region.

References:

1: Managing GuardDuty accounts with AWS Organizations : Amazon GuardDuty Findings : How Amazon GuardDuty Works : Cross-Region aggregation in AWS Security Hub

the reason why there were no alerts on the sudo commands. Sudo commands are commands that allow a user to execute commands as another user, usually the superuser or root. CloudWatch Logs agent is a software agent that can send log data from an EC2 instance to CloudWatch Logs, a service that monitors and stores log data. The CloudWatch Logs agent needs an IAM instance profile, which is a container for an IAM role that allows applications running on an EC2 instance to make API requests to AWS services. If the IAM instance profile on the EC2 instance was not properly configured to allow the CloudWatch Logs agent to push the logs to CloudWatch, then there would be no alerts on the sudo commands. The other options are either irrelevant or invalid for explaining why there were no alerts on the sudo commands.

The correct answer is D.

To design a solution that will proactively monitor for suspicious behavior across all the accounts that contain production workloads, the security engineer needs to use a service that can aggregate and analyze security findings from multiple sources. AWS Security Hub is a service that provides a comprehensive view of your security posture across your AWS accounts and enables you to check your environment against security standards and best practices. Security Hub also integrates with other AWS services, such as Amazon GuardDuty, AWS Config, and AWS Systems Manager, to collect and correlate security findings.

To automate remediation of incidents across the production accounts, the security engineer needs to use a service that can trigger actions based on events. Amazon EventBridge is a serverless event bus service that allows you to connect your applications with data from a variety of sources. EventBridge can use rules to match events and route them to targets for processing. You can use EventBridge to invoke a custom AWS Lambda function from the Security Hub findings. Lambda is a serverless compute service that lets you run code without provisioning or managing servers.

To publish a notification to an Amazon SNS topic when a critical security finding is detected, the security engineer needs to use a service that can send messages to subscribers. Amazon SNS is a fully managed messaging service that enables you to decouple and scale microservices, distributed systems, and serverless applications. SNS can deliver messages to a variety of endpoints, such as email, SMS, or HTTP. You can configure the Lambda function to also publish notifications to the SNS topic.

To send all security incident logs to a dedicated account, the security engineer needs to use a service that can aggregate and store log data from multiple sources. AWS Security Hub allows you to aggregate security findings from multiple accounts into a single account using the delegated administrator feature. This feature enables you to designate an AWS account as the administrator for Security Hub in an organization. The administrator account can then view and manage Security Hub findings from all member accounts.

Therefore, option D is correct because it meets all the requirements of the solution. Option A is incorrect because GuardDuty does not provide a comprehensive view of your security posture across your AWS accounts. GuardDuty is primarily a threat detection service that monitors for malicious or unauthorized behavior. Option B is incorrect because Config and Systems Manager are not designed to automate remediation of incidents based on Security Hub findings. Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit, and evaluate the configurations of your AWS resources, while Systems Manager is a service that allows you to manage your infrastructure on AWS at scale. Option C is incorrect because GuardDuty does not provide a comprehensive view of your security posture across your AWS accounts.

References:

• AWS Security Hub
• Amazon EventBridge
• AWS Lambda
• Amazon SNS
• Aggregating Security Hub findings across accounts

The correct combination of steps that the security engineer should take to meet these requirements are A. Ensure that the Amazon CloudWatch agent is installed on all the EC2 instances that the Auto Scaling groups launch. Generate a CloudWatch agent configuration file to forward the required logs to Amazon CloudWatch Logs., B. Set the log retention for desired log groups to 7 years., and C. Attach an IAM role to the launch configuration or launch template that the Auto Scaling groups use. Configure the role to provide the necessary permissions to forward logs to Amazon CloudWatch Logs.

A. This answer is correct because it meets the requirement of ensuring that no logging data is lost for each instance during scaling activities. By installing the CloudWatch agent on all the EC2 instances, the security engineer can collect and send system logs and application logs to CloudWatch Logs, which is a service that stores and monitors log data. By generating a CloudWatch agent configuration file, the security engineer can specify which logs to forward and how often.

B. This answer is correct because it meets the requirement of keeping the logs for only the required period of 7 years. By setting the log retention for desired log groups, the security engineer can control how long CloudWatch Logs retains log events before deleting them. The security engineer can choose a predefined retention period of 7 years, or use a custom value.

C. This answer is correct because it meets the requirement of providing the necessary permissions to forward logs to CloudWatch Logs. By attaching an IAM role to the launch configuration or launch template that the Auto Scaling groups use, the security engineer can grant permissions to the EC2 instances that are launched by the Auto Scaling groups. By configuring the role to provide the necessary permissions, such as cloudwatch:PutLogEvents and cloudwatch:CreateLogStream, the security engineer can allow the EC2 instances to send log data to CloudWatch Logs.

To resolve the issues, the security engineer should make the following change to the policy:

• In the statement block that contains the Sid “Allow use of the key”, under the “Condition” block, change the Kms:ViaService value to ec2.us-east-1.amazonaws.com. This allows the security engineer to restrict the use of the key to only EC2 service in the us-east-1 region, and prevent other services from using the key.

One can use the IAM Encryption CLI to encrypt the data before sending it across to the S3 bucket. Options A and C are invalid because this would still mean that data is transferred in plain text Option D is invalid because you cannot just enable client side encryption for the S3 bucket For more information on Encrypting and Decrypting data, please visit the below URL:

The correct answer is: Use the IAM Encryption CLI to encrypt the data first Submit your Feedback/Queries to our Experts

Adjusting the IAM policy attached to the IAM role used by EC2 instances to include the necessary AWS Logs API actions for publishing logs to CloudWatch Logs addresses the issue. This ensures that the EC2 instances have the required permissions to interact with CloudWatch Logs, facilitating the successful publication of logs from the instances.

the most secure way to meet the requirements. TLS is a protocol that provides encryption and authentication for data in transit. ALB is a service that distributes incoming traffic across multiple EC2 instances. HIDS is a system that monitors and detects malicious activity on a host. ECDHE is a type of cipher suite that supports perfect forward secrecy, which is a property that ensures that past and current TLS traffic stays secure even if the certificate private key is leaked. By creating a listener on the ALB that does not enable PFS cipher suites, and using encrypted connections to the servers using ECDHE cipher suites, you can ensure that the HIDS agents can capture the traffic of the EC2 instance without compromising the privacy of the users. The other options are either less secure or less compatible with the third-party solution.

This answer is correct because logging in with read-only credentials minimizes the risk of accidental or malicious changes to the AWS account. Reviewing the GuardDuty finding can help identify which API calls initiated the finding and which IAM principal was involved. Using Amazon Detective can help analyze and visualize the API calls in context, such as which resources were affected, which IP addresses were used, and how the activity deviated from normal patterns. Amazon Detective can also help identify related findings from other sources, such as AWS Config or AWS Audit Manager.

The correct answer is D.

To implement short-term credentials for third-party AWS accounts, you can use IAM roles and trust policies. A trust policy is a JSON policy document that defines who can assume the role. You can specify the AWS account ID of the third-party account as a principal in the trust policy, and use the sts:ExternalId condition key to enhance the security of the role. The sts:ExternalId condition key is a unique identifier that is agreed upon by both parties and included in the AssumeRole request. This way, you can prevent the “confused deputy” problem, where an unauthorized party can use the same role as a legitimate party.

Option A is incorrect because bearer token authentication with OAuth or SAML is not suitable for granting access to AWS accounts and resources. Amazon Cognito and API Gateway are used for building web and mobile applications that require user authentication and authorization.

Option B is incorrect because AWS IAM Identity Center (AWS Single Sign-On) is a service that simplifies the management of access to multiple AWS accounts and cloud applications for your workforce users. It does not support granting access to third-party AWS accounts.

Option C is incorrect because using AWS Secrets Manager to create a random external key is not necessary and adds operational complexity. You can use the sts:ExternalId condition key instead to provide a unique identifier for each external account.

To meet the requirements of importing their own key material, setting an expiration date on the keys, and deleting keys immediately, the security engineer should do the following:

• Configure AWS KMS and use a custom key store. This allows the security engineer to use a key manager outside of AWS KMS that they own and manage, such as an AWS CloudHSM cluster or an external key manager.
• Create a customer managed CMK with no key material. Import the company’s keys and key material into the CMK. This allows the security engineer to use their own key material for encryption and decryption operations, and to specify an expiration date for it.

The correct answer is B, D, and F. Designate an AWS account in an organization in AWS Organizations as a delegated administrator for Security Hub. Publish events to Amazon EventBridge from the delegated administrator account, all member accounts, and required Regions that are enabled for Security Hub findings. In each Region, create an Amazon EventBridge rule to deliver findings to an Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose delivery stream. Configure the Kinesis Data Firehose delivery streams to deliver the logs to a single Amazon S3 bucket. Partition the Amazon S3 data. Use AWS Glue to crawl the S3 bucket and build the schema. Use Amazon Athena to query the data and create views to flatten nested attributes. Build Amazon QuickSight dashboards that use the Athena views.

According to the AWS documentation, AWS Security Hub is a service that provides you with a comprehensive view of your security state across your AWS accounts, and helps you check your environment against security standards and best practices. You can use Security Hub to aggregate security findings from various sources, such as AWS services, partner products, or your own applications.

To use Security Hub with multiple AWS accounts and Regions, you need to enable AWS Organizations with all features enabled. This allows you to centrally manage your accounts and apply policies across your organization. You can also use Security Hub as a service principal for AWS Organizations, which lets you designate a delegated administrator account for Security Hub. The delegated administrator account can enable Security Hub automatically in all existing and future accounts in your organization, and can view and manage findings from all accounts.

According to the AWS documentation, Amazon EventBridge is a serverless event bus that makes it easy to connect applications using data from your own applications, integrated software as a service (SaaS) applications, and AWS services. You can use EventBridge to create rules that match events from various sources and route them to targets for processing.

To use EventBridge with Security Hub findings, you need to enable Security Hub as an event source in EventBridge. This will allow you to publish events from Security Hub to EventBridge in the same Region. You can then create EventBridge rules that match Security Hub findings based on criteria such as severity, type, or resource. You can also specify targets for your rules, such as Lambda functions, SNS topics, or Kinesis Data Firehose delivery streams.

According to the AWS documentation, Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose is a fully managed service that delivers real-time streaming data to destinations such as Amazon S3, Amazon Redshift, Amazon Elasticsearch Service (Amazon ES), and Splunk. You can use Kinesis Data Firehose to transform and enrich your data before delivering it to your destination.

To use Kinesis Data Firehose with Security Hub findings, you need to create a Kinesis Data Firehose delivery stream in each Region where you have enabled Security Hub. You can then configure the delivery stream to receive events from EventBridge as a source, and deliver the logs to a single S3 bucket as a destination. You can also enable data transformation or compression on the delivery stream if needed.

According to the AWS documentation, Amazon S3 is an object storage service that offers scalability, data availability, security, and performance. You can use S3 to store and retrieve any amount of data from anywhere on the web. You can also use S3 features such as lifecycle management, encryption, versioning, and replication to optimize your storage.

To use S3 with Security Hub findings, you need to create an S3 bucket that will store the logs from Kinesis Data Firehose delivery streams. You can then partition the data in the bucket by using prefixes such as account ID or Region. This will improve the performance and cost-effectiveness of querying the data.

According to the AWS documentation, AWS Glue is a fully managed extract, transform, and load (ETL) service that makes it easy to prepare and load your data for analytics. You can use Glue to crawl your data sources, identify data formats, and suggest schemas and transformations. You can also use Glue Data Catalog as a central metadata repository for your data assets.

To use Glue with Security Hub findings, you need to create a Glue crawler that will crawl the S3 bucket and build the schema for the data. The crawler will create tables in the Glue Data Catalog that you can query using standard SQL.

According to the AWS documentation, Amazon Athena is an interactive query service that makes it easy to analyze data in Amazon S3 using standard SQL. Athena is serverless, so there is no infrastructure to manage, and you pay only for the queries that you run. You can use Athena with Glue Data Catalog as a metadata store for your tables.

To use Athena with Security Hub findings, you need to create views in Athena that will flatten nested attributes in the data. For example, you can create views that extract fields such as account ID, Region, resource type, resource ID, finding type, finding title, and finding description from the JSON data. You can then query the views using SQL and join them with other tables if needed.

According to the AWS documentation, Amazon QuickSight is a fast, cloud-powered business intelligence service that makes it easy to deliver insights to everyone in your organization. You can use QuickSight to create and publish interactive dashboards that include machine learning insights. You can also use QuickSight to connect to various data sources, such as Athena, S3, or RDS.

To use QuickSight with Security Hub findings, you need to create QuickSight dashboards that use the Athena views as data sources. You can then visualize and analyze the findings using charts, graphs, maps, or tables. You can also apply filters, calculations, or aggregations to the data. You can then share the dashboards with your users or embed them in your applications.

The correct answer is C. Update the existing bucket policy in the Amazon S3 console with the new log file prefix, and then update the log file prefix in the CloudTrail console.

According to the AWS documentation1, a bucket policy is a resource-based policy that you can use to grant access permissions to your Amazon S3 bucket and the objects in it. Only the bucket owner can associate a policy with a bucket. The permissions attached to the bucket apply to all of the objects in the bucket that are owned by the bucket owner.

When you create a trail in CloudTrail, you can specify an existing S3 bucket or create a new one to store your log files. CloudTrail automatically creates a bucket policy for your S3 bucket that grants CloudTrail write-only access to deliver log files to your bucket. The bucket policy also grants read-only access to AWS services that you can use to view and analyze your log data, such as Amazon Athena, Amazon CloudWatch Logs, and Amazon QuickSight.

If you want to update the log file prefix for an existing trail, you must also update the existing bucket policy in the S3 console with the new log file prefix. The log file prefix is part of the resource ARN that identifies the objects in your bucket that CloudTrail can access. If you don’t update the bucket policy with the new log file prefix, CloudTrail will not be able to deliver log files to your bucket, and you will receive an error message when you try to save the change in the CloudTrail console.

The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Creating a new trail with the updated log file prefix, and then deleting the original trail is not necessary and may cause data loss or inconsistency. You can simply update the existing trail and its associated bucket policy with the new log file prefix.
• B. Updating the existing bucket policy in the S3 console to allow the Security Engineer’s Principal to perform PutBucketPolicy is not relevant to this issue. The PutBucketPolicy action allows you to create or replace a policy on a bucket, but it does not affect CloudTrail’s ability to deliver log files to your bucket. You still need to update the existing bucket policy with the new log file prefix.
• D. Updating the existing bucket policy in the S3 console to allow the Security Engineer’s Principal to perform GetBucketPolicy is not relevant to this issue. The GetBucketPolicy action allows you to retrieve a policy on a bucket, but it does not affect CloudTrail’s ability to deliver log files to your bucket. You still need to update the existing bucket policy with the new log file prefix.

References:

1: Using bucket policies - Amazon Simple Storage Service

To quickly identify other compute resources with the specific version of the web framework installed, the team should do the following:

• Scan all the EC2 instances with AWS Systems Manager to identify the vulnerable version of the web framework. This allows the team to use AWS Systems Manager Inventory to collect and query information about the software installed on their EC2 instances, and to filter the results by software name and version.

these are the steps that can meet the requirements in the most secure manner. CloudTrail is a service that records AWS API calls and delivers log files to an S3 bucket. Turning on CloudTrail in each IAM account can help capture all IAM API calls made within those accounts. Updating the bucket policy of the bucket in the account that will be storing the logs can help grant other accounts permission to write log files to that bucket. The other options are either unnecessary or insecure for logging and analyzing IAM API calls.

The best solution to meet the company's requirements of offering an alternative login method while securely protecting player credentials and reducing the burden of password resets is to use Amazon Cognito with user pools. Amazon Cognito provides a fully managed service that facilitates the authentication, authorization, and user management for web and mobile applications. By configuring Amazon Cognito user pools to federate access with third-party Identity Providers (IdPs), such as social media platforms or Google, the company can allow users to sign in through these external IdPs, thereby eliminating the need for traditional username and password logins. This not only enhances user convenience but also offloads the responsibility of managing user credentials and the associated challenges like password resets to Amazon Cognito, thereby reducing the burden on the company's customer service team. Additionally, Amazon Cognito integrates seamlessly with other AWS services and follows best practices for security and compliance, ensuring that the player's credentials are protected.

The most cost-effective way to correct a typo in a vault lock policy during the 24-hour initiation period is to call the abort-vault-lock operation. This action stops the vault lock process, allowing the security engineer to correct the policy and re-initiate the vault lock with the corrected policy. This approach avoids the need for data transfer or creating a new vault, thus minimizing costs and operational overhead.

A bastion host is a special purpose computer on a network specifically designed and configured to withstand attacks. The computer generally hosts a single application, for example a proxy server, and all other services are removed or limited to reduce the threat to the computer.

In IAM, A bastion host is kept on a public subnet. Users log on to the bastion host via SSH or RDP and then use that session to manage other hosts in the private subnets.

Options A and B are invalid because the bastion host needs to sit on the public network. Option D is invalid because bastion hosts are not used for monitoring For more information on bastion hosts, just browse to the below URL:

The correct answer is: Bastion hosts allow users to log in using RDP or SSH and use that session to SSH into internal network to access private subnet resources.

Submit your Feedback/Queries to our Experts

because these are the steps that can ensure that the service-linked role can launch instances with encrypted volumes. A service-linked role is a type of IAM role that is linked to an AWS service and allows the service to perform actions on your behalf. A KMS grant is a mechanism that allows you to delegate permissions to use a customer master key (CMK) to a principal such as a service-linked role. A KMS grant specifies the actions that the principal can perform, such as encrypting and decrypting data. By creating a KMS grant for the service-linked role with the specified actions, you can allow the service-linked role to use the CMK in Account-2 to launch instances with encrypted volumes. By attaching an IAM policy to the role attached to the EC2 instances with KMS actions and then allowing Account-1 in the KMS key policy, you can also enable cross-account access to the CMK and allow the EC2 instances to use the encrypted volumes. The other options are either incorrect or unnecessary for meeting the requirement.

The most likely cause of the error is that the instance profile for the EC2 instance does not have the s3:PutObject permission for the S3 bucket. This permission is needed to upload logs to the bucket. Therefore, the security engineer should ensure that the instance profile has this permission.

One possible solution is to attach the AWSImageBuilderFullAccess policy to the instance profile for the EC2 instance. This policy grants full access to Image Builder resources and related AWS services, including the s3:PutObject permission for any bucket with “imagebuilder” in its name. However, this policy may grant more permissions than necessary, which violates the principle of least privilege.

Another possible solution is to create a custom policy that only grants the s3:PutObject permission for the specific S3 bucket that is used for logging. This policy can be attached to the instance profile along with the other policies that are required for Image Builder functionality: EC2InstanceProfileForImageBuilder, EC2InstanceProfileForImageBuilderECRContainerBuilds, and AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCore. This solution follows the principle of least privilege more closely than the previous one.

• Ensure that the following policies are attached to the instance profile for the EC2 instance: EC2InstanceProfileForImageBuilder, EC2InstanceProfileForImageBuilderECRContainerBuilds, and AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCore.
• Ensure that the instance profile for the EC2 instance has the s3:PutObject permission for the S3 bucket. This can be done by either attaching the AWSImageBuilderFullAccess policy or creating a custom policy with this permission.

1: Using managed policies for EC2 Image Builder - EC2 Image Builder 2: PutObject - Amazon Simple Storage Service 3: AWSImageBuilderFullAccess - AWS Managed Policy

For a company using AWS Organizations that requires centralized management and automatic activation of Amazon GuardDuty across all current and future AWS accounts, setting up a delegated administrator account for GuardDuty is the optimal solution. By enabling GuardDuty in a new account and designating it as the delegated administrator, the company can centrally manage GuardDuty findings and automatically enroll new AWS accounts into GuardDuty as they are created within the organization. This approach ensures consistent threat detection and continuous monitoring across all accounts, aligning with best security practices.

The correct answer is A and B. The principal’s identity-based policy grants access to put objects into the S3 bucket with no conditions, and the principal’s identity-based policy overrides the condition because the identity-based policy contains an explicit allow.

The reason is that when evaluating access requests, AWS uses a combination of resource-based policies (such as bucket policies) and identity-based policies (such as IAM user policies) to determine whether to allow or deny the action. According to the AWS documentation1, “If an explicit allow exists in either the resource-based policy or the identity-based policy, then AWS allows access to the resource.” Therefore, even if the bucket policy has a condition that checks the tag values, it will not be effective if the principal’s identity-based policy has an explicit allow for the PutObject action without any conditions. The explicit allow in the identity-based policy will override the condition in the bucket policy and grant access to the principal.

The other options are incorrect because:

• C. The S3 bucket’s resource policy does not deny access to put objects. This is not a factor that causes the PutObject operation to succeed when the tag values are different. The bucket policy can either allow or deny access based on conditions, but it cannot prevent an explicit allow in the identity-based policy from taking effect.
• D. The S3 bucket’s resource policy cannot allow actions to the principal. This is not true. The bucket policy can allow actions to specific principals by using the Principal element in the policy statement. According to the AWS documentation2, “The Principal element specifies the user (IAM user, federated user, or assumed-role user), AWS account, AWS service, or other principal entity that is allowed or denied access to a resource.”
• E. The bucket policy does not apply to principals in the same zone of trust. This is not true. The bucket policy applies to any principal that is specified in the Principal element, regardless of whether they are in the same zone of trust or not. A zone of trust is a logical boundary that defines who can access a resource and under what conditions. According to the AWS documentation3, “A zone of trust can be as small as a single resource (for example, an Amazon S3 object) or as large as an entire AWS account.”

To support answer B, use the reference IAMstatic.com/whitepapers/IAM-security-whitepaper.pdf

"For example, IAM Config provides a managed IAM Config Rules to ensure that encryption is turned on for all EBS volumes in your account."

The AWS documentation states that you can use the awslogs log driver to send log information to CloudWatch Logs. To use this method, you specify the parameters for awslogs-group and awslogs-region in the LogConfiguration property of the container definition. This method is the easiest way to send logs to CloudWatch Logs.

References: : Amazon Elastic Container Service Developer Guide

To preserve the data for 7 years and prevent anyone from changing or deleting it, the security officer needs to use a service that can store the data securely and enforce compliance controls. The most cost-effective way to do this is to use Amazon S3 Glacier, which is a low-cost storage service for data archiving and long-term backup. S3 Glacier allows you to create a vault, which is a container for storing archives. Archives are any data such as photos, videos, or documents that you want to store durably and reliably.

S3 Glacier also offers a feature called Vault Lock, which helps you to easily deploy and enforce compliance controls for individual vaults with a Vault Lock policy. You can specify controls such as “write once read many” (WORM) in a Vault Lock policy and lock the policy from future edits. Once a Vault Lock policy is locked, the policy can no longer be changed or deleted. S3 Glacier enforces the controls set in the Vault Lock policy to help achieve your compliance objectives. For example, you can use Vault Lock policies to enforce data retention by denying deletes for a specified period of time.

To use S3 Glacier and Vault Lock, the security officer needs to follow these steps:

• Create a vault in S3 Glacier using the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI), or AWS SDKs.
• Create a Vault Lock policy in S3 Glacier that meets all the regulatory requirements using the IAM policy language. The policy can include conditions such as aws:CurrentTime or aws:SecureTransport to further restrict access to the vault.
• Initiate the lock by attaching the Vault Lock policy to the vault, which sets the lock to an in-progress state and returns a lock ID. While the policy is in the in-progress state, you have 24 hours to validate your Vault Lock policy before the lock ID expires. To prevent your vault from exiting the in-progress state, you must complete the Vault Lock process within these 24 hours. Otherwise, your Vault Lock policy will be deleted.
• Use the lock ID to complete the lock process. If the Vault Lock policy doesn’t work as expected, you can stop the Vault Lock process and restart from the beginning.
• Upload the data to the vault using either direct upload or multipart upload methods.

For more information about S3 Glacier and Vault Lock, see S3 Glacier Vault Lock.

The other options are incorrect because:

• Option A is incorrect because creating an Amazon S3 bucket and configuring it to use S3 Object Lock in compliance mode will not prevent anyone from changing or deleting the data. S3 Object Lock is a feature that allows you to store objects using a WORM model in S3. You can apply two types of object locks: retention periods and legal holds. A retention period specifies a fixed period of time during which an object remains locked. A legal hold is an indefinite lock on an object until it is removed. However, S3 Object Lock only prevents objects from being overwritten or deleted by any user, including the root user in your AWS account. It does not prevent objects from being modified by other means, such as changing their metadata or encryption settings. Moreover, S3 Object Lock requires that you enable versioning on your bucket, which will incur additional storage costs for storing multiple versions of an object.
• Option B is incorrect because creating an Amazon S3 bucket and configuring it to use S3 Object Lock in governance mode will not prevent anyone from changing or deleting the data. S3 Object Lock in governance mode works similarly to compliance mode, except that users with specific IAM permissions can change or delete objects that are locked. This means that users who have s3:BypassGovernanceRetention permission can remove retention periods or legal holds from objects and overwrite or delete them before they expire. This option does not provide strong enforcement for compliance controls as required by the regulatory requirements.
• Option D is incorrect because creating an Amazon S3 bucket and using a lifecycle rule to transition the data to a vault in S3 Glacier will not prevent anyone from changing or deleting the data. Lifecycle rules are actions that Amazon S3 automatically performs on objects during their lifetime. You can use lifecycle rules to transition objects between storage classes or expire them after a certain period of time. However, lifecycle rules do not apply any compliance controls on objects or prevent them from being modified or deleted by users. Moreover, transitioning objects from S3 to S3 Glacier using lifecycle rules will incur additional charges for retrieval requests and data transfers.

The correct answer is A and C.

When using ABAC, the principal’s identity-based policy and the S3 bucket’s resource policy are both evaluated to determine the effective permissions. If either policy grants access to the principal, the action is allowed. If either policy denies access to the principal, the action is denied. Therefore, to enforce the tag-based condition, both policies must deny access when the tag values do not match.

In this case, the principal’s identity-based policy grants access to put objects into the S3 bucket with no conditions (A), which means that the policy does not check for the tag values. This policy overrides the condition in the bucket policy because an explicit allow always takes precedence over an implicit deny. The bucket policy can only allow or deny actions to the principal based on the condition, but it cannot override the identity-based policy.

The S3 bucket’s resource policy does not deny access to put objects ©, which means that it also does not check for the tag values. The bucket policy can only allow or deny actions to the principal based on the condition, but it cannot override the identity-based policy.

Therefore, the combination of factors A and C are causing the PutObject operation to succeed when the tag values are different.

References:

• Using ABAC with Amazon S3
• Bucket policy examples