Free and Premium Microsoft SC-300 Dumps Questions Answers

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This question asks you to apply the stated Technical Requirements for Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) to complete the form. The specific scenario about "User3" is a distraction, as the configuration applies to all users.

The relevant technical requirements are:

"Users must provide one authentication method to reset their password by using SSPR."

This directly dictates the value for the Number of authentication methods required, which is 1.

"Available methods must include: Email, Phone, Security questions, The Microsoft Authenticator app"

This lists all the options that are configured to be available for SSPR, which determines the value for Authentication methods that can be used: Email,Phone,Security questions,The Microsoft Authenticator app.

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), the per-user device cap is controlled in Devices > Device settings. The SC-300 materials describe that administrators can configure “Users may join devices to Azure AD” and the “Maximum number of devices per user”. The guide notes that this limit defaults to five and is used to “control how many devices a user can join or register in Azure AD”; when users reach the limit, “they cannot add additional devices until the limit is increased or an existing device is removed.” For scenarios like field or sales staff who use multiple devices, the study content recommends adjusting this value to meet business needs. Because A. Datum’s sales users hit the current cap and a requirement states “Increase the maximum number of devices that can be joined or registered to Azure AD to 10,” the fix is to change the tenant’s Device settings—not User settings, Access reviews, or Security defaults. This aligns with the exam objective to configure device settings for Azure AD join and registration and addresses the precise symptom reported by users.

Assigning built-in directory roles (like Device Administrators) to a group requires a role-assignable group. The SC-300 documentation explains: “You can assign Azure AD roles to a cloud security group by creating the group with the setting ‘Azure AD roles can be assigned to the group.’” It further emphasizes: “This attribute is immutable; you must decide at creation time. You cannot convert an existing group to be role-assignable later.” When a standard security group is not created as role-assignable, it will not appear in the picker when attempting to assign a directory role—exactly the behavior observed: “groups that aren’t role-assignable cannot be selected for Azure AD role assignments.” Therefore, the first step is to recreate IT_Group1 as a role-assignable security group (often called an “eligible for role assignment” group) and then assign the Device Administrators role to that group. Changing membership types (Dynamic User or Dynamic Device) or adding owners does not convert an existing group into a role-assignable one and thus would not resolve the issue.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization for Azure AD”, Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync is the preferred solution when you need to synchronize objects from multiple Active Directory (AD DS) forests without establishing forest trusts.

The scenario specifies that trust relationships must NOT be established between adatum.com and litware.com, but A. Datum must still sync the AD DS users and groups of litware.com to their existing Azure AD tenant (adatum.com).

The SC-300 training materials clarify:

“Azure AD Connect cloud sync enables syncing from multiple AD forests to a single Azure AD tenant without the need for forest trusts or a full Azure AD Connect installation in each forest.”

Unlike staging mode (which provides a standby sync server for failover) or extending the same Azure AD Connect instance to another domain (which requires trust relationships and network connectivity between forests), Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync uses lightweight agents and does not depend on forest trust.

Therefore, to meet the requirement of syncing Litware’s AD DS to A. Datum’s Azure AD tenant without creating a trust, the correct choice is to configure Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync between the Azure AD tenant and the litware.com domain.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM), the SC-300 materials explain that role assignment type determines how a user obtains permissions. An eligible assignment means the user requests activation when needed; an active assignment grants continuous permissions. As the guide states, “Eligible assignments require the user to activate the role for just-in-time access, while active assignments grant standing access.” To allow users of the User administrator role to request the role when needed, you must set assignments to Eligible rather than active.

The same objective also calls for ensuring this capability is available “for up to one year.” In PIM role configuration, the duration of an eligibility is controlled by the Expire eligible assignments after policy. The documentation describes that administrators can “configure the maximum duration for eligible assignments by setting ‘Expire eligible assignments after’ to a specific period (for example, months up to one year).” Therefore, you must modify the “Expire eligible assignments after” setting to the required period.

No requirement mentions activation justification or ticket metadata; those are optional controls used to add context to activations. Consequently, the two actions that directly satisfy the stated technical requirement are: set all assignments to Eligible (C) and configure “Expire eligible assignments after” (D).

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn “Implement and manage Azure AD Identity Protection” module, Azure AD Identity Protection detects two primary categories of risks: user risks and sign-in risks.

User Risk Policy:A user risk represents the probability that a user's identity (credentials) has been compromised. Examples of user risk signals include leaked credentials, unusual sign-ins from different geographies, or sign-ins from infected devices. The Exam Ref SC-300 specifically lists “leaked credentials detected on the dark web or other compromised repositories” as the main trigger for a user risk policy. Such a policy can automatically force password change or enforce MFA to remediate the threat.

Sign-in Risk Policy:A sign-in risk reflects the likelihood that a specific authentication attempt is not performed by the legitimate user. Sign-in risk is based on context, such as sign-ins from suspicious browsers, anonymous IP addresses (like TOR networks), or impossible travel scenarios. The SC-300 documentation highlights these examples as conditions best handled with a sign-in risk policy, where conditional access can block or require MFA for the risky sign-in attempt.

Therefore:

Leaked credentials are addressed through a User Risk Policy, since the account itself is compromised.

Sign-ins from suspicious browsers and access from anonymous IP addresses are handled through Sign-in Risk Policies, as they relate to risky sessions rather than compromised identities.

The requirement is:

“Require admin approval for application access to organizational data.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300 exam guide and Microsoft documentation on “Configure consent settings for applications”, Azure AD provides User consent settings under Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions to control how applications can request permissions to access organizational data.

By default, users can consent to allow apps to access organizational data on their behalf, which can create security risks. To ensure tighter control, administrators can:

Disable user consent entirely, or

Require admin consent workflow so that when users try to grant an app access, it must first be approved by an administrator.

The SC-300 study materials explicitly describe:

“To require administrator approval before an app can access organizational data, configure the User consent settings to use the admin consent workflow.”

This aligns perfectly with the stated requirement — to ensure admin approval is required before apps gain access to organizational data.

Other options are incorrect:

Authentication methods manage MFA and SSPR, not app consent.

Access packages are part of Identity Governance for resource access, not app consent.

Application Proxy publishes on-premises apps, not related to app consent permissions.

Azure AD External collaboration settings govern who can bring guests into the tenant. The SC-300 content specifies: “External collaboration settings let you control who can invite guests (Anyone, Members, Guests, or Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role) and whether guests can invite.” It also highlights: “To restrict guest invitations to administrators or designated inviters, configure External collaboration to ‘Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role’ and disable guest-to-guest invitations if required.” Because the problem states that “Anyone in the organization can invite guest users, including other guests and non-administrators,” the remediation is to tighten External collaboration settings so only approved roles (e.g., Global admins, Guest Inviter, or specific administrators) can invite. Access reviews address periodic entitlement verification, Conditional Access enforces sign-in/session policies, and Continuous Access Evaluation relates to token lifetime/signal-based revocation; none of these change who can send guest invitations. Adjusting External collaboration settings directly resolves the issue and aligns with the requirement that “only users that are assigned specific admin roles can invite guest users.”

For Identity Governance (Entitlement Management), the materials clarify who can create and manage access reviews of access packages: “To create or manage access reviews for access packages, you must be a Global administrator, an Identity Governance administrator, a catalog owner for the catalog that contains the access package, or an access package manager.” The exam text also states: “User administrator does not grant the ability to manage entitlement management access reviews unless the user is delegated as a catalog owner or access package manager.” Given the scenario’s user roles, User3 (Identity Governance administrator) and User5 (Global administrator) satisfy these permissions and therefore can create and manage the access review for Package1. By contrast, User4 (User administrator) cannot perform this task by role alone. This selection follows the least-privilege guidance emphasized in SC-300: use specialized governance roles (Identity Governance admin or delegated catalog roles) rather than broad directory roles when possible.

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

✅ To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments → Privileged role administrator

✅ To manage Azure built-in role assignments → User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

✅ Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

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On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook → Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors → Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook → Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

✅ Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

The SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect explains that when you need to bring in a new set of on-premises users or change what is synchronized (for example, adding an additional domain/OU such as ADatum or adjusting filtering), you reopen the Azure AD Connect wizard and choose “Customize synchronization options.” The guide notes that this path lets you “modify directory/OU filtering, add or remove forests, and enable optional sync features” so that only the intended users are synchronized. It contrasts with operational commands: Start-ADSyncSyncCycle merely triggers an immediate delta/full sync of the current configuration; Set-ADSyncScheduler changes the sync cadence or pause/resume behavior; and “Change user sign-in” alters the authentication method (e.g., PHS vs. PTA) but does not control scoping of which users are synced. To meet a requirement to sync the ADatum users according to technical constraints (such as OU/domain selection or feature toggles), you must first configure the scope by running the wizard and selecting Customize synchronization options, then perform/allow a sync cycle to bring those users into Azure AD as defined.

As per the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study materials and Microsoft Learn documentation on “Manage administrative units in Azure Active Directory”, Administrative Units (AUs) are designed to delegate administrative permissions within large organizations based on divisions such as geography or department. They provide scoped administrative control—allowing helpdesk or user administrators to manage users only within a specific subset of the directory, such as a branch office or department.

In this scenario, Contoso’s technical requirement states:

“The helpdesk administrators must be able to manage licenses for only the users in their respective office.”

To fulfill this, you must create an administrative unit for each branch office (e.g., Montreal, London, Seattle) and assign helpdesk administrators scoped to those AUs. This ensures that each helpdesk admin can only manage licenses for the users within their respective office, enforcing the principle of least privilege.

The Azure Active Directory admin center is the correct tool for creating and managing administrative units. SC-300 guidance clarifies that administrative units are Azure AD objects, not on-premises Active Directory objects like Organizational Units (OUs). Therefore, they are created and managed exclusively through the Azure portal, Microsoft Graph, or PowerShell for Azure AD, but the most straightforward interface for exam purposes is the Azure AD admin center.

To deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for only the members of the Sg-Finance group, excluding Debra Berger, and without using a Conditional Access policy, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in as a Security Administrator or Global Administrator.

Navigate to MFA settings:

Go to Users > Active users.

On the Active users page, select Multi-factor authentication.

Manage user settings:

Find and select the Sg-Finance group.

Enable MFA for this group by setting the requirement status to Enabled.

Exclude a user from MFA:

In the Multi-factor authentication page, search for Debra Berger.

Set her MFA status to Disabled to exclude her from MFA registration.

Verify the configuration:

Ensure that all members of the Sg-Finance group have MFA enabled except for Debra Berger.

Communicate the change:

Inform the Sg-Finance group members about the MFA requirement and provide instructions on how to register for MFA.

Monitor the setup:

Check the sign-in logs to confirm that MFA is being prompted for the Sg-Finance group members and not for Debra Berger.

To implement a process for reviewing guest users’ access to the Salesforce app with the specified requirements, you can use Microsoft Entra’s Identity Governance access reviews feature. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Assign the appropriate role:

Ensure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, User Administrator, or Identity Governance Administrator1.

Navigate to Identity Governance:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center.

Go toIdentity governance>Access reviews1.

Create a new access review:

Select New access review.

Choose the Salesforce app to review guest user access1.

Configure the review settings:

Set the frequency of the review to monthly.

Define thedurationof the review period to5 days1.

Determine the reviewers:

Assign the manager of each guest user as the reviewer.

If a guest user does not have a manager, assignMegan Bowenas the reviewer1.

Automate the removal process:

Configure settings toautomatically remove accessif the review is not completed within the specified time frame1.

Monitor and enforce compliance:

Regularly check the access review results to ensure compliance with the review policy1.

Communicate the process:

Inform all stakeholders about the new review process and provide guidance on how to complete the reviews.

By following these steps, you can ensure that guest users’ access to the Salesforce app is reviewed monthly, with managers being responsible for the review, and access is removed if the review is not completed in time.

To ensure that users in the Sg-Operations group see a tab named “Operations” containing only LinkedIn and Box applications in the My Apps portal, you can create a collection with these specific applications. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, Application Administrator, or owner of the service principal.

Navigate to App launchers:

Go to Identity > Applications > Enterprise applications.

Under Manage, select App launchers.

Create a new collection:

Click on New collection.

Enter “Operations” as the Name for the collection.

Provide a Description if necessary.

Add applications to the collection:

Select the Applications tab within the new collection.

Click on + Add application.

Search for and select LinkedIn and Box applications.

Click Add to include them in the collection.

Assign the collection to the Sg-Operations group:

Select the Users and groups tab.

Click on + Add users and groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Operations group.

Click Select to assign the collection to the group.

Review and create the collection:

Select Review + Create to check the configuration.

If everything is correct, click Create to finalize the collection.

By following these steps, when users in the Sg-Operations group visit the My Apps portal, they will see a new tab named “Operations” that contains only the LinkedIn and Box applications1.

Please note that to create collections on the My Apps portal, you need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license1.

To prevent all users from using legacy authentication protocols when authenticating to Microsoft Entra ID, you can create a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy authentication. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Conditional Access Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Give your policy a name that reflects its purpose, like “Block Legacy Auth”.

Set users and groups:

Under Assignments, select Users or workload identities.

Under Include, select All users.

Under Exclude, select Users and groups and choose any accounts that must maintain the ability to use legacy authentication.It’s recommended to exclude at least one account to prevent lockout1.

Target resources:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps.

Set conditions:

Under Conditions > Client apps, set Configure to Yes.

Check only the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.

Configure access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Block access.

Enable policy:

Confirm your settings and set Enable policy to Report-only initially to understand the impact.

After confirming the settings using report-only mode, you can move theEnable policytoggle fromReport-onlytoOn2.

By following these steps, you will block legacy authentication protocols for all users, enhancing the security posture of your organization by requiring modern authentication methods. Remember to monitor the impact of this policy and adjust as necessary to ensure business continuity.

To configure the account lockout settings so that accounts are locked out for five minutes after 10 failed sign-in attempts, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to the lockout settings:

Go to Security > Authentication methods > Password protection.

Adjust the Smart Lockout settings:

Set the Lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-in attempts.

Set the Lockout duration (in minutes) to 5.

Please note that by default, smart lockout locks an account from sign-in after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public and Microsoft Azure operated by 21Vianet tenants1. The lockout period is one minute at first, and longer in subsequent attempts.However, you can customize these settings tomeet your organization’s requirements if you have Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher licenses for your users1.

To ensure that all users can consent to apps that require permission to read their user profile and prevent them from consenting to apps that require any other permissions, you can configure the user consent settings in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Here’s how you can do it:

Sign in as a Global Administrator:

Access the Microsoft Entra admin center with Global Administrator privileges.

Navigate to user consent settings:

Go toIdentity>Applications>Enterprise applications>Consent and permissions>User consent settings1.

Configure the consent settings:

Under User consent for applications, select the option that allows users to consent to apps that only require permission to read their user profile.

Ensure that all other permissions are set to require administrator consent, thus preventing users from consenting to apps that require additional permissions1.

Save the settings:

After configuring the consent settings, select Save to apply the changes.

By following these steps, you will have configured the system to allow user consent for apps that need to read the user profile while blocking consent for apps that require additional permissions. This setup helps maintain user autonomy where appropriate while safeguarding against unauthorized access to broader permissions.

To add the LinkedIn application as a resource to the Sales and Marketing access package without removing any other resources, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Identity Governance Administrator.

Navigate to Entitlement Management:

Go to Identity governance > Entitlement management > Access packages1.

Select the Sales and Marketing access package:

Find and select the Sales and Marketing access package to modify it.

Add a new resource:

Within the access package details, select Resources.

Click on + Add resource.

Search for and select the LinkedIn application from the list of available resources.

Configure the resource role:

Assign the appropriate role for the LinkedIn application that users in the Sales and Marketing access package will have.

Review and update the access package:

Ensure that the LinkedIn application has been added as a resource.

Confirm that no other resources have been removed from the access package.

Save the changes:

After reviewing, save the changes to the access package.

Communicate the update:

Notify the relevant users about the addition of the LinkedIn application to their access package.

By following these steps, you will successfully add the LinkedIn application to the Sales and Marketing access package without affecting the other resources.

To assign a Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license to the Sg-Retail group, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have the role of Global Administrator or License Administrator.

Navigate to the licensing page:

Go toBilling>Licenses1.

Find the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license:

Look for the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license in the list of available products.

Assign licenses to the group:

Select the license and then choose Assign licenses.

Search for and select the Sg-Retail group.

Confirm the assignment and make sure that the correct number of licenses is available for the group.

Review and confirm the assignment:

Ensure that the licenses have been properly assigned to the Sg-Retail group without affecting other groups or users.

Monitor the license status:

Check the license usage and status to ensure that the Sg-Retail group members can utilize the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 features.

By following these steps, the Sg-Retail group should now have the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 licenses assigned to them.

To create a group named “Audit” and ensure that its members can activate the Security Reader role, follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to Groups:

Go toTeams & groups>Active teams and groups1.

Create the security group:

Select Add a security group.

On the Set up the basics page, enter “Audit” as the group name.

Add a description if necessary and chooseNext1.

Edit settings:

On theEdit settingspage, select whether you want Microsoft Entra roles to be assignable to this group and selectNext1.

Assign roles:

After creating the group, go to Roles > All roles.

Find and select the Security Reader role.

Under Assignments, choose Assign.

Select the “Audit” group to assign the role to its members2.

Review and finish:

Review the settings to ensure the “Audit” group is created with the ability for its members to activate the Security Reader role.

Finish the setup and save the changes.

By following these steps, you will have created the “Audit” group and enabled its members to activate the Security Reader role, which allows them to view security-related information without having permissions to change it. Remember to communicate the new group and role assignment to the relevant stakeholders in your organization.

To implement additional security checks for the Sg-Executive group members before they canaccess any company apps, you can use Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Security Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Name the policy appropriately, such as “Sg-Executive Security Checks”.

Assign the policy to the Sg-Executive group:

Under Assignments, select Users and groups.

Choose Select users and groups and then Groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Executive group.

Define the application control conditions:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps to apply the policy to any company app.

Set the device compliance requirement:

Under Conditions > Device state, configure the policy to include devices marked as compliant by Microsoft Intune.

Set the app protection policy requirement:

Under Conditions > Client apps, configure the policy to include client apps that are protected by app protection policies.

Configure the access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Grant access.

Choose Require device to be marked as compliant and Require approved client app.

Ensure that the option Require one of the selected controls is enabled.

Enable the policy:

Set Enable policy to On.

Review and save the policy:

Review all settings to ensure they meet the requirements.

Click Create to save and implement the policy.

By following these steps, you will ensure that the Sg-Executive group members can only access company apps if they meet one of the specified conditions, either by using a compliant device or a protected client app. This enhances the security posture of your organization by enforcing stricter access controls for executive-level users.

The exhibit shows Password Hash Synchronization (PHS) enabled and Pass-through Authentication (PTA) enabled. The SC-300 materials clarify that when both PTA and PHS are enabled, Azure AD can fall back to PHS if PTA agents become unavailable. The guidance states that PHS can serve as a backup sign-in method to ensure continuity during on-premises connectivity failures. In this scenario, on-premises connectivity to the internet is lost, so PTA agents cannot process sign-ins. Because PHS is enabled, synchronized users can still authenticate in Azure AD using their synced password hashes.

User1 is a cloud-only user and authenticates directly in Azure AD—unaffected by on-premises outages.

User2 is directory-synced; with PTA down, sign-in falls back to PHS, allowing access as long as the hash is present.

User3 is a guest; guests authenticate in their home directory/IdP, independent of your on-premises environment, so they can still sign in.Therefore, during the outage, all three users (User1, User2, and User3) can sign in to Azure AD, satisfying the behavior described in the SC-300 documentation regarding PHS backup for PTA and guest sign-in independence.

The question asks which role allows a user to create access reviews for Azure AD roles using the principle of least privilege.

Privileged Role Administrator can manage all role assignments and access reviews, but it has more privileges than needed.

Identity Governance Administrator manages entitlement management and access packages, not Azure AD roles directly.

User Administrator can manage users but not access reviews for roles.

✅ User Access Administrator is the correct least-privilege role, as it allows management of access reviews related to Azure AD roles and role-assignable groups.

From Microsoft Documentation (SC-300 Exam Guide):

“The User Access Administrator role allows management of access reviews and permissions for Azure AD roles and resources using the least-privileged approach.”

To enforce a Terms of Use (ToU) prompt when users sign in, the SC-300 exam and Microsoft Learn materials specify configuring it under a Conditional Access policy. The ToU object must first be created in Microsoft Entra ID → Identity Governance → Terms of Use, then linked to a Conditional Access policy via Grant Controls → Require Terms of Use.

Access packages and lifecycle workflows (A, C) handle identity lifecycle and provisioning, not authentication-time prompts. Authentication methods (D) manage how users sign in but not policy-based ToU enforcement.

The issue described is that disabled on-premises AD accounts can still authenticate to Azure AD for up to 30 minutes. This behavior occurs when Password Hash Synchronization (PHS) is used, as authentication happens directly against the cloud copy of the password hash, which syncs periodically (every 30 minutes by default).

The proposed solution — configuring password writeback — allows users to reset or change their on-premises password from Azure AD (via self-service password reset). However, it does not affect the authentication flow or timing of disabled account status replication between AD and Azure AD.

From Microsoft documentation:

“Password writeback enables users to reset their on-premises passwords from the cloud but does not impact authentication or account disable synchronization.”

Therefore, configuring password writeback does not prevent a disabled user from authenticating in Azure AD until the next sync occurs.

 User1: Key Vault Crypto Officer

 User2: Key Vault Certificates Officer

As detailed in Microsoft documentation and the Exam Ref SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator, Azure Key Vault provides role-based access control (RBAC) to manage keys, secrets, and certificates independently. The built-in roles are designed with the principle of least privilege — granting users only the permissions necessary to perform their tasks.

According to the Microsoft Learn module “Manage access to Key Vault using Azure RBAC”, the relevant built-in roles are:

Key Vault Crypto Officer — This role allows users to manage cryptographic keys in a key vault. Specifically, the Crypto Officer can create, import, delete, and manage keys, as well as perform cryptographic operations such as encrypt, decrypt, sign, and verify. This aligns perfectly with the requirement that User1 must manage and create keys in Vault1.

Key Vault Certificates Officer — This role allows a user to manage and retrieve certificates within a key vault. It provides access to read, import, and delete certificates but not to manage or create keys or secrets. This satisfies the requirement that User2 must access a certificate stored in Vault1.

The Exam Ref SC-300 emphasizes that the least privilege principle requires assigning users the lowest possible role that meets their operational needs. Therefore, assigning Key Vault Crypto Officer to User1 and Key Vault Certificates Officer to User2 ensures compliance, minimal access exposure, and operational

In Azure AD, user consent and admin consent workflows control which users or administrators can approve access to organizational data requested by applications.

The question states:

“Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to: Yes”

“Who can review admin consent requests: Admin2, User2”

When User1 attempts to add an app that requires consent to access company data, and if that app requires admin consent, the request is routed to those designated as admin consent reviewers. In this case, Admin2 and User2 are listed, but only one has the administrative capability to approve the request.

Based on Microsoft documentation:

“Only users who hold an administrative role such as Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, or Authentication Administrator and are designated as reviewers can grant consent on behalf of the organization.”

Here, Admin2 holds the Authentication Administrator role — an Azure AD admin-level role — while User2 has no administrative privileges. Thus, Admin2 is the only eligible user to approve the admin consent request.

No

No

Yes

a) When you assign a group to an application, only users in the group will have access. The assignment does not cascade to nested groups.

b) Tested in lab, existing owners will be replaced. Also direct assignment (resource owner) is path of least privilege. (replicated in test)

c) Application setting 'visible to users' is set to No, then no users see this application on their My Apps portal and O365 launcher.

Reference

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide, Azure AD Enterprise Application Self-service configuration determines how users can request access, who approves it, and whether access is automatically granted. Let’s analyze each statement based on the exhibits:

Members of Group3 can access App1 without approval from User1 — NOIn the Group1 exhibit, Group1 contains User1, User4, and Group3. In the App1 Self-Service exhibit, it shows that “Require approval before granting access” is set to Yes, and User1 is designated as the approver. Therefore, even though Group3 members might indirectly be part of Group1, access requests to App1 must still be approved by User1 before being granted.

After configuring self-service, the owner of Group1 is User1 — NOThe PowerShell command Get-AzureADGroupOwner clearly shows that Admin (not User1) is the owner of Group1. Configuring self-service for an application does not change group ownership; it only defines how access requests are handled. Ownership of Group1 remains with Admin.

App1 appears in the Microsoft 365 app launcher of User4 — YESIn the App1 Properties exhibit, the “User assignment required” setting is set to Yes. This means only assigned users (directly or via groups) can see and access the application. Since Group1 is configured as the target group for user assignment and User4 is a member of Group1, User4 will see App1 in their Office 365 app launcher after assignment approval.

This logic follows Microsoft Learn documentation:

“When a user is assigned to an enterprise application (either directly or through group membership), the application appears in the user's Office 365 app launcher once access is granted.”

In SC-300, the mitigation for unsolicited MFA prompts (push fatigue) is Fraud alert on Azure AD MFA. The materials state that administrators can “allow users to report suspicious MFA prompts and automatically block the user when they select Report fraud in Microsoft Authenticator.” By contrast, Account lockout settings are designed to “temporarily lock an account after a configurable number of consecutive MFA denials to thwart brute-force attempts,” and they do not initiate an automatic block tied to a user’s fraud report. The study guide further clarifies that fraud alerts “can automatically block the user for a specified period (default 90 days) when a fraudulent attempt is reported,” which is precisely the behavior required in the scenario. Therefore, merely configuring Account lockout settings will not meet the goal of automatically blocking users when they report an unsolicited prompt.

The SC-300 curriculum emphasizes synchronization behavior between on-premises Active Directory (AD) and Microsoft Entra ID using Microsoft Entra Connect. By default, directory synchronization occurs every 30 minutes, which means a user disabled in AD can still authenticate to Microsoft Entra for up to 30 minutes until the next synchronization cycle.

The proposed solution—Microsoft Entra Password Protection—is not related to authentication delay or sign-in blocking. Password Protection enforces strong password policies and prevents the use of weak or compromised passwords during account creation or reset. It does not control sign-in states or enforce real-time disablement.

To meet the goal of immediately blocking authentication when an account is disabled in AD, you must implement Microsoft Entra Connect with Pass-through Authentication (PTA) or federation (AD FS). These options validate sign-ins against the on-premises AD in real time, ensuring instant blocking of disabled accounts.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“Password Protection does not affect authentication latency or synchronization frequency. To ensure disabled accounts cannot sign in, use Pass-through Authentication or federation for real-time validation.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation on Azure AD group assignments for enterprise applications, only specific group types in Azure AD can be assigned to enterprise applications (service principals).

Azure AD allows group-based assignment for enterprise applications only when the group is a Security group or a Mail-enabled security group. This is because Azure AD uses security groups for authorization purposes.

Let’s analyze the groups from the table:

Group

Type

Assignable to App1?

Reason

Group1

Security

✅ Yes

Security groups are used for managing access permissions and can be assigned to apps.

Group2

Distribution

❌ No

Distribution groups are used for email distribution lists and cannot be used for access management.

Group3

Microsoft 365

❌ No

Microsoft 365 (formerly Office 365) groups manage collaboration resources like Teams and SharePoint but are not supported for enterprise app assignments.

Group4

Mail-enabled security

✅ Yes

Mail-enabled security groups combine mailing capabilities with security functionality and can be used to assign permissions to applications.

The Microsoft documentation states:

“You can assign access to enterprise applications in Azure AD to users, security groups, and mail-enabled security groups. Distribution lists and Microsoft 365 groups are not supported for app assignments.”

Thus, for App1, which is an enterprise application, you can assign only Group1 (Security) and Group4 (Mail-enabled Security).