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AWS provides EBS Block Public Access at the AWS Organizations level, which, when enabled, prevents EBS snapshots from being shared publicly across all member accounts. This is an organization-wide control that requires minimal configuration and no ongoing monitoring to prevent public sharing.

This directly satisfies the requirement:

Covers all accounts managed by Organizations.

Explicitly prevents public snapshot sharing.

Has the least operational overhead because it is a single centralized control.

AWS Config (Option A) only monitors and alerts, but does not prevent public sharing.

An IAM policy in the root account (Option C) is harder to enforce consistently across all accounts and may not cover all permission paths.

CloudTrail (Option D) only logs events and does not prevent public access.

AWS best practices strongly recommend enabling MFA on the root user, but they also emphasize planning for MFA device loss. AWS allows the configuration of multiple MFA devices for the root user, which provides redundancy and ensures continued access in disaster scenarios. Option B directly addresses the requirement by enabling a backup authentication method without weakening security controls.

Adding multiple MFA devices ensures that if one device is lost, damaged, or unavailable, the organization can still authenticate securely using the secondary device. This approach maintains strong security while eliminating the risk of permanent root account lockout. It also avoids time-consuming recovery processes that require contacting AWS Support and proving account ownership.

Option A is not sufficient because IAM administrator accounts do not replace root access and cannot perform certain root-only actions. Options C and D are not feasible because new administrator accounts or policy changes cannot be made if root access is already lost.

Therefore, B is the correct and AWS-recommended solution to ensure uninterrupted, secure access to the root account while maintaining MFA protection.

AWS Lake Formation provides centralized data access control, including fine-grained (column-level) permissions for data stored in S3 and accessed through services like Amazon Athena.

Using a Lake Formation blueprint to ingest data from Aurora MySQL into the data lake keeps ingestion and governance integrated. When QuickSight uses Athena as the data source, Athena enforces Lake Formation’s column-level permissions automatically. This allows the marketing team to see only the authorized subset of columns without custom access-control logic.

Options A, B, and C rely on manually limiting columns at ingestion time or using IAM or S3 bucket policies, which do not provide true column-level authorization for SQL queries and require significantly more manual work and maintenance.

The IAM policy includes two statements:

1️⃣ Allow ec2:TerminateInstances on all resources

2️⃣ Deny ec2:TerminateInstances if the request does NOT come from:

192.0.2.0/24

203.0.113.0/24

AWS IAM policy evaluation rules state:

Explicit Deny always overrides Allow.

A request must meet all applicable conditions in the policy to be granted.

aws:SourceIp condition applies when IAM actions are invoked via the public AWS APIs.

In this scenario, the administrator is not originating the request from one of the allowed CIDR blocks, so the Deny condition is triggered, overriding the Allow statement.

Therefore, the operation is blocked with:

403 AccessDenied: explicit deny

This matches the behavior described in the AWS IAM Policy Evaluation Logic used in the Security Pillar of the Well-Architected Framework:

Explicit Deny > Allow > Default Deny

IP-based Conditions restrict API calls originating outside approved network ranges

Options A/B/C do not accurately reflect this explicit Deny condition behavior.