HP HPE7-A02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

The "Detect Valid SSID Misuse" event in Aruba's Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) indicates that a valid SSID, associated with your network, is being broadcast from an unauthorized source. This scenario often signals a potential rogue access point attempting to deceive clients into connecting to it (e.g., for credential harvesting or man-in-the-middle attacks).

1. Explanation of Each Option

A. Clients are failing to authenticate to corporate SSIDs. You should first check for misconfigured authentication settings and then investigate a possible threat:

Incorrect:

This event is not related to authentication failures by legitimate clients.

Misconfigured authentication settings would lead to events like "authentication failures" or "radius issues," not "valid SSID misuse."

B. Admins have likely misconfigured SSID security settings on some of the company's APs. You should have them check those settings:

Incorrect:

This event refers to an external device broadcasting your SSID, not misconfiguration on the company’s authorized APs.

WIDS differentiates between valid corporate APs and rogue APs.

C. Hackers are likely trying to pose as authorized APs. You should use the detecting radio information and immediately track down the device that triggered the event:

Correct:

This is the most likely cause of the "detect valid SSID misuse" event. A rogue AP broadcasting a corporate SSID could lure clients into connecting to it, exposing sensitive credentials or traffic.

Immediate action includes:

Using the radio information from the event logs to identify the rogue AP's location.

Physically locating and removing the rogue device.

Strengthening WIPS/WIDS policies to prevent further misuse.

D. This event might be a threat but is almost always a false positive. You should wait to see the event over several days before following up on it:

Incorrect:

While false positives are possible, "valid SSID misuse" is a critical security event that should not be ignored.

Delaying action increases the risk of successful attacks against your network.

2. Recommended Steps to Address the Event

Review Event Logs:

Gather details about the rogue AP, such as SSID, MAC address, channel, and signal strength.

Locate the Rogue Device:

Use the detecting AP's radio information and signal strength to triangulate the rogue AP's physical location.

Respond to the Threat:

Remove or disable the rogue device.

Notify the security team for further investigation.

Prevent Future Misuse:

Strengthen security policies, such as enabling client whitelists or enhancing WIPS protection.

References

Aruba WIDS/WIPS Configuration and Best Practices Guide.

Aruba Central Security Event Analysis Documentation.

Wireless Threat Management Using Aruba Networks.

Integration of CPDI and CPPM for Zero Trust:

CPDI (ClearPass Device Insight) identifies and profiles devices and applications on the network.

CPDI can tag devices based on their behavior or detected applications.

CPPM uses these tags to enforce policies, such as quarantining clients that violate security rules (e.g., using prohibited applications).

Option Analysis:

Option A: Incorrect. CPPM does not inform CPDI about role assignments; CPDI provides device context to CPPM.

Option B: Correct. CPDI tags clients, and CPPM uses those tags to enforce quarantine or other Zero Trust actions.

Option C: Incorrect. Custom fingerprint definitions are not part of this integration.

Option D: Incorrect. CPDI provides information about devices, not user identities.

Comprehensive Detailed Explanation

The configuration includes the command aaa authentication allow-fail-through, which specifies that if the TACACS+ server fails to respond (e.g., times out), the switch will proceed to the next authentication method in the sequence, which is local. In this scenario:

The switch first attempts to authenticate the user against the TACACS+ server.

When the TACACS+ server fails to respond, the switch falls back to local authentication.

The user netadmin is a local account configured on the switch and belongs to the operators group.

As a result, the user is successfully authenticated locally and is granted operator level access.

References

Aruba AOS-CX User Guide: Authentication fallback mechanisms.

TACACS+ fallback behavior for HPE Aruba switches.