Exactprep CWSP-208 Questions

Though AES-CCMP is secure and 802.1X authentication is strong, LEAP is inherently weak because:

B. LEAP uses MS-CHAPv1, making it vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks once challenge/response exchanges are captured.

F. Layer 1 DoS attacks (such as RF jamming or interference) can be launched regardless of authentication mechanisms.

Incorrect:

A. AES-CCMP resists encryption cracking.

C. Peer-to-peer at Layer 3 is unrelated to LEAP or 802.1X vulnerabilities.

D. Application-layer eavesdropping is mitigated if encryption is properly implemented.

E. Session hijacking is more difficult with proper authentication and encryption in place.

In this scenario, although the bank’s website uses HTTPS (which encrypts communications between John’s browser and the bank’s server), the compromise did not occur during the banking session itself. Instead, the attacker exploited a common security mistake: credential reuse.

John reused his email credentials for his bank login, and he accessed his email using a POP3 client without encryption at a public hotspot. This means his username and password were sent in cleartext, which is trivially easy to sniff on an open wireless network. Once an attacker obtained those credentials, they could use them to log into his bank account if the same credentials were used there.

Here's how this aligns with CWSP knowledge domains:

CWSP Security Threats & Attacks: This is a classic example of credential harvesting via cleartext protocols (POP3), and password reuse, both of which are significant risks in WLAN environments.

CWSP Secure Network Design: Recommends use of encrypted protocols (e.g., POP3S or IMAPS) and user education against password reuse.

CWSP WLAN Security Fundamentals: Emphasizes that open Wi-Fi networks offer no encryption by default, leaving unprotected protocols vulnerable to sniffing and interception.

Other answer options and why they are incorrect:

A & D are invalid because an expired or unsigned certificate may cause browser warnings but won’t result in sending credentials unencrypted unless the user bypasses HTTPS (which wasn’t stated).

C is incorrect: IPSec VPNs encrypt all data between the client and VPN endpoint—including credentials.

E is technically incorrect and misleading: intercepting the public key of an HTTPS session doesn't allow decryption of the credentials due to asymmetric encryption and session key security. Real-time decryption of HTTPS traffic without endpoint compromise is not feasible.

Open networks with captive portals do not provide link-layer encryption, so:

A. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM): Attackers can intercept or modify traffic between the user and the legitimate network (especially before HTTPS negotiation).

B. Wi-Fi phishing: Evil twin APs may mimic the legitimate hotspot and show a fake captive portal, stealing user credentials or prompting malicious downloads.

Incorrect:

C. Management interface exploits target device admin panels, not typical client users.

D. UDP port redirection and

E. IGMP snooping are network-layer behaviors, not common user-targeted attacks.

To hijack a wireless client, attackers often use:

An RF jamming device to disconnect the client from the legitimate AP (via deauth attacks or RF disruption)

A rogue AP (created using access point software) that impersonates the real network

DHCP server software to assign IP addresses and act as a gateway, completing the fake network

Incorrect:

B. Terminal emulation is not relevant.

C. Workgroup bridges and protocol analyzers are for monitoring, not attacking.

E. MAC spoofing and DoS do not complete a hijack.