ECCouncil 112-57 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

In Tor Browser deployments, Tor typically runs a local client (“tor” process) that exposes aSOCKS proxyfor applications (the browser) to send traffic into the Tor network and, optionally, acontrol interfacefor managing circuits and obtaining runtime status. In many forensic lab guides and Tor Browser bundle configurations, the default local SOCKS listening port is9150, and the associated Tor control port is commonly9151. This pairing is frequently referenced in investigations because endpoint triage (e.g., netstat outputs, firewall logs, EDR socket telemetry) may show local loopback connections from the browser to127.0.0.1:9150(SOCKS) and management communications involving9151(control).

From a network-forensics viewpoint, these ports help distinguish Tor Browser activity from other proxy tools: the browser does not directly connect to Tor relays; instead, it hands traffic to the local SOCKS proxy, which then establishes encrypted circuits to Tor nodes. While Tor can be configured to use different ports, the question asks about the specific ports used for establishing Tor connections in typical Tor Browser setups, which aligns with9150/9151. Therefore, the correct option isD.

In Windows forensics, analyzingMicrosoft Edgeuser activity commonly involves extracting and correlating browser artifacts such asvisited URLs, visit counts, timestamps, download references, and cached content indicators. A practical forensic approach is to use a tool that canparse and normalize history artifacts across multiple browsers, because investigations often require comparing activity between Edge and other installed browsers on the same workstation.BrowsingHistoryViewis designed specifically for that purpose: it aggregates browsing history from different browsers and presents it in a unified timeline-style view, which supports rapid triage and cross-validation of user activity.

By contrast,MZHistoryViewandMZCacheVieware associated withMozilla-family artifacts(history and cache), making them appropriate for Firefox-related examinations rather than Edge.ChromeHistoryViewis specialized forGoogle Chromehistory databases and does not target Edge artifacts as its primary source. In forensic workflow terms, a multi-browser history tool is valuable because it helps identify patterns such as repeated access to specific domains, time windows of browsing activity, and correlation with other Windows artifacts (prefetch, jump lists,

Ahoneypotis a deliberately deployed decoy system or service designed toattract attackersby appearing valuable or vulnerable, thereby enabling defenders to observe malicious behavior in a controlled manner. Digital forensics and incident response references describe honeypots as tools forthreat intelligence and evidence collection, because they can record interaction details such as connection sources, exploited services, commands executed, malware dropped, and attempted privilege escalation. This directly matches the scenario: Steven deployed something that “appears to contain very useful information” tolure attackersand help identify theirlocations and techniques. Honeypots are typically instrumented with extensive logging and monitoring, making them especially useful for building timelines, extracting indicators of compromise, and understanding adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The other options do not align with the “bait attackers” goal. AnIDSprimarily detects and alerts on suspicious activity but is not intended to impersonate a valuable target. Afirewallenforces access control rules to block/allow traffic, not entice attackers. Arouterforwards packets and provides network connectivity; it is not a deception platform. Therefore, the device type described is aHoneypot (C).