AWS Certified Professional DOP-C02 Book

it involves adding an IPv6 CIDR block to the VPC and subnets for the ALB and specifying the dualstack IP address type on the ALB listener. This allows the ALB to listen on both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and forward requests to the EC2 instances that are added as targets to the target group associated with the ALB.

The requirement specifies enforcing encryption before CloudFormation creates or updates resources. This is key because preventive enforcement must occur during the provisioning workflow, not after resources already exist. AWS provides CloudFormation Hooks specifically for this purpose. A Hook allows an organization to intercept a CloudFormation stack operation and validate resource configurations before provisioning occurs. This feature is recommended by AWS for pre-deployment governance such as enforcing encryption policies, tag compliance, or security restrictions.

By enabling trusted access between CloudFormation StackSets and AWS Organizations, the Hook can be deployed centrally from the delegated administrator account across all accounts in the specified OU. Any attempt to create or update EBS volumes or SQS queues through CloudFormation is validated first by the Hook. If encryption is not configured, the operation fails immediately.

Option C (SCP) blocks API calls globally, but SCPs cannot perform conditional logic based on resource properties passed by CloudFormation prior to creation. Option B (AWS Config) detects violations after resources already exist, which does not satisfy “before stack operation.” Option D (Lambda remediation) also occurs after the resource is created.

Thus, CloudFormation Hooks distributed via StackSets provide the only solution that enforces compliance before the provisioning lifecycle

To ensure that CloudTrail cannot be disabled in any member account, the control must be enforced above the individual accounts, at the organization level , and must not be overridable by local administrators. AWS Service Control Policies (SCPs) provide exactly this capability: they define permission guardrails that apply to all IAM users, roles, and even the root user in accounts within an AWS Organizations OU.

By applying an SCP that explicitly denies cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail , the organization prevents any principal in the affected accounts from disabling logging or deleting the trails, regardless of their IAM permissions. This provides strong, centralized enforcement of audit logging.

Option B uses IAM policies in each account. Local administrators with sufficient privileges could modify or detach those policies, defeating the control. Option C only sends notifications and does not prevent the action. Option D with AWS Config auto-remediation still allows a window where CloudTrail is disabled and also can be disabled or modified itself.

Therefore, the most robust and least bypassable approach is to use an SCP at the OU level to deny CloudTrail stop and delete actions.