8010 Exam Dumps : Operational Risk Manager (ORM) Exam

Marginal probabilities of default are the probabilities for default for a given period, conditional on survival till the end of the previous period. Cumulative probabilities of default are probabilities of default by a point in time, regardless of when the default occurs. If the marginal probabilities of default for periods 1, 2... n are p1, p2...pn, then cumulative probability of default can be calculated as Cn = 1 - (1 - p1)(1-p2)...(1-pn). For this question, we can calculate the probability of default for year 3 as =1 - (1-2%)*(1-3%)*(1-4%) = 8.74%

Internal loss data isgenerally the highest quality as it is relevant, and is 'real' as it has occurred to the organization. External loss data suffers from a significant limitation that the risk profiles of the banks to which the data relates is generally not known due to anonymization, and may likely may not be applicable to the bank performing the calculations. Therefore, replacing external loss data with external loss data is not a good idea. Statement IV is therefore incorrect.

All other approach described are valid approaches for the risk analyst to consider and implement. Therefore statements I, II and III are correct and IV is not.

According to a paper by the BCBS, here is an excellent summary of what happened. Based on this, Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

"At the outset of the crisis, mortgage default shocks played a part in the deterioration of marketprices of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). Simultaneously, these shocks revealed deficiencies in the models used to manage and price these products. The complexity and resulting lack of transparency led to uncertainty about the value of the underlying investment. Market participants then drastically scaled down their activity in the origination and distribution markets and liquidity disappeared. The standstill in the securitisation markets forced banks to warehouse loans that were intended to be soldin the secondary markets. Given a lack of transparency of the ultimate ownership of troubled investments, funding liquidity concerns were triggered within the banking sector as banks refused to provide sufficient funds to each other. This in turn led to the hoarding of liquidity, exacerbating further the funding pressures within the banking sector. The initial difficulties in subprime mortgages also fed through to a broader range of market instruments since the drying up of market and funding liquidity forced market participants to liquidate those positions which they could trade in order to scale back risk. An increase in risk aversion also led to a general flight to quality, an example of which was the high withdrawals by households from money market funds."