300-740 Exam Dumps : Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints

From the firewall access rules provided, Rule 1 allows traffic from 20.1.1.10 (GCP VM) to 20.1.1.1 using HTTPS. However, this destination is not the actual mail server—the mail server resides at 192.168.200.10 (inside network). Therefore:

A: Rule 1 must be updated to reflect the correct destination: 192.168.200.10. Without this change, traffic is not permitted to the mail server.

D: NAT (Network Address Translation) is needed to translate the external address (e.g., 20.1.1.10) to access internal addresses (like 192.168.200.10). As per SCAZT and Cisco firewall policies, NAT enables proper packet delivery from public to private zones.

Rule 2, which denies all other traffic, is correctly placed after the specific allow rule. Therefore, moving it (Option B) would not help, and Options C and E are unrelated to resolving the immediate firewall access and routing issue.

According to the SCAZT guide, the “Always-on” deployment mode for Cisco Secure DDoS (including integration with Secure Web Application Firewall solutions) provides continuous protection for both volumetric and application-layer attacks. This deployment model ensures that all traffic flows through the scrubbing and WAF infrastructure without requiring traffic redirection only during attack events. It provides real-time mitigation and immediate detection, which is essential to address both volumetric attacks (e.g., SYN floods) and Layer 7 (application-layer) attacks such as HTTP floods and injection-based threats.

While “Hybrid” and “On-demand” modes are useful for specific use cases, only “Always-on” offers continuous and comprehensive protection required for environments that demand consistent uptime and threat prevention.

In IKEv1 policy configuration for Cisco ASA, two key commands are required to define the encryption and hashing algorithms:

A: encryption aes-256 defines the encryption method for the IKE SA.

E: hash sha-256 ensures SHA-256 is used as the integrity mechanism during IKE phase 1.

According to Cisco documentation and SCAZT (Section 1: Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 19–22), these two components are essential to negotiating a secure VPN tunnel. The provided config uses group 1 (modp768), which is weak by today’s standards and could also lead to negotiation failure. However, from the available options, encryption and hash are the two required for tunnel success.