CIMA F3 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

CIMA F3 explains that the Dividend Growth Model (DGM) is only suitable where dividends are stable, predictable, and capable of being forecast with reasonable confidence. It is therefore weak when applied to young, unlisted, high-risk companies, especially those with uncertain future cash flows.

A. No established dividend payment pattern – ✔ Correct

Company B has made losses in its first three years and has not paid dividends. CIMA F3 explicitly states that the dividend growth model is unsuitable where there is no dividend history, because the model relies on extrapolating future dividends from past patterns.

B. Uses future projected dividends – ✘ Incorrect

This is not a weakness, but a fundamental feature of the dividend growth model. All valuation models are forward-looking, and CIMA F3 does not consider this a limitation.

C. Growth rate difficult to determine – ✔ Correct

The business operates in a unique, high-risk sector, and future earnings and dividends are highly uncertain. CIMA F3 highlights that the DGM is extremely sensitive to the assumed growth rate, making it unreliable when growth cannot be estimated with confidence.

D. Time value of money ignored – ✘ Incorrect

The dividend growth model explicitly discounts future dividends, meaning it fully incorporates the time value of money, a core principle taught in F3.

E. Cost of capital difficult to estimate – ✔ Correct

As an unlisted company, Company B has no observable beta or market data. CIMA F3 stresses that estimating the cost of equity for private, high-risk businesses is problematic, reducing the reliability of DGM outputs.

Competition authorities focus primarily on market structure and competition, not on whether the bid is generous or on employment promises. Their concern is: Will this merger substantially lessen competition?

In food retailing, a key issue is local market concentration – for example, a single group owning too many supermarkets in particular towns or regions. A classic remedy is for the bidder to divest overlapping outlets so that effective competition remains.

B. Agreeing to dispose of specified outlets which overlap geographically directly addresses the competition authority’s main concern and is the standard structural remedy used in practice.

A (more cash) is irrelevant to competition issues.

C (job guarantees) is mainly a political/employment concern, not an antitrust one.

D (promise to pass on cost savings) is difficult to monitor and enforce and is normally viewed as less credible than structural remedies.

So the action most likely to persuade the competition authorities is B.

Current debt interest:

Existing: 5m×8%=0.40m5\text{m} \times 8\% = 0.40\text{m}5m×8%=0.40m

New: 2m×10%=0.20m2\text{m} \times 10\% = 0.20\text{m}2m×10%=0.20m

Total interest = 0.60m

Let annual sales = SSS.

Operating profit margin = 20% → OP = 0.20 S.

Interest cover covenant:

0.20S0.60≥4⇒0.20S≥2.4⇒S≥2.40.20=12.0 million\frac{0.20 S}{0.60} \ge 4 \Rightarrow 0.20 S \ge 2.4 \Rightarrow S \ge \frac{2.4}{0.20} = 12.0\ \text{million}0.600.20S​≥4⇒0.20S≥2.4⇒S≥0.202.4​=12.0 million

Correct answer: A. $12.00 million