ISA-IEC-62443 Questions Bank

The asset model is used in ISA/IEC 62443 to represent and describe the relationships and dependencies between different assets in an IACS environment. This model helps organizations identify and document assets, their interconnections, and their significance for operational and cybersecurity purposes. The zone model builds upon the asset model for segmentation, but the asset model itself establishes the foundational relationships.

The Ukrainian power grid cyberattack (2015 and 2016 incidents) is widely documented as a “nation state” attack. It was attributed to a highly skilled, well-resourced group with nation-state backing, and demonstrated the ability to compromise, disrupt, and remotely control industrial systems in critical infrastructure. This attack is discussed in ISA/IEC 62443 training and guidance as an example of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity targeting industrial control systems.

ISA/IEC 62443 clearly distinguishes roles to assign cybersecurity responsibilities across the IACS lifecycle. A company that designs and manufactures embedded devices and network components—such as PLCs, RTUs, switches, or control software—but does not install or operate them is classified as a Product Supplier.

Step 1: Definition of a Product Supplier

Within ISA/IEC 62443 (notably Parts 4-1 and 4-2), a product supplier is the entity responsible for developing and delivering IACS products. Their responsibilities include secure product development, vulnerability handling, patch creation, and providing security-related product documentation.

Step 2: Exclusion of operational roles

Because the company does not perform on-site installation, commissioning, operation, or maintenance, it does not qualify as an integration or maintenance service provider. It also does not own or operate the system, so it is not an asset owner.

Step 3: Security responsibility alignment

ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 assigns product suppliers responsibility for secure development lifecycle practices, while 4-2 defines the technical security capabilities the products must support.

Therefore, the correct role is Product supplier.

The Triton (also known as Trisis) malware specifically targeted and compromised Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), disabling the emergency shutdown capabilities at a petrochemical plant. This attack demonstrated that safety systems, once considered isolated and secure, are vulnerable to sophisticated, targeted cyberattacks. Neither Zeus, Stuxnet, nor WannaCry had this specific impact on emergency shutdown safety systems.