Free and Premium Juniper JN0-232 Dumps Questions Answers

Afeature profilein a UTM (Unified Threat Management) configuration defines how a specific UTM feature should operate. Examples include:

Anantivirus feature profilethat specifies the type of scanning to perform (streaming or full file-based).

Aweb filtering feature profilethat defines filtering methods, categories, and actions.

Anantispam profilethat defines how spam detection and actions are performed.

Feature profiles do not directly apply to traffic or policies. Instead, they arereferenced inside a UTM policy, and then that policy is applied to a security policy.

Therefore, a feature profile’s purpose is todefine the operation of a specific UTM feature.

When two networks use the same private IP address ranges, conflicts occur. The solution is to use address translation techniques on the SRX:

NAT (Network Address Translation):Translates private IP addresses to another IP range, enabling connectivity between overlapping private networks.

PAT (Port Address Translation):Extends NAT by allowing multiple private IPs to share one or a few public IPs using different port numbers. This is especially useful when there is a limited pool of public IP addresses.

Other options:

IDP (Option A):Intrusion Detection and Prevention, unrelated to address overlap.

BGP (Option C):A routing protocol, but it does not solve overlapping IP addressing problems.

Correct Features:NAT and PAT

Destination NAT purpose (Option C):Used to allow external hosts on the Internet to access internal/private resources (such as a web server in the DMZ). Destination NAT changes the destination IP of incoming traffic to match the internal server.

Pool-based NAT (Option D):SRX supports destination NAT pools, allowing multiple public IP addresses or ranges to be translated to internal servers.

Incorrect options:

Option A describessource NAT, not destination NAT.

Option B is incorrect because SRX does not support “interface-based” destination NAT.

Correct Statements:C and D

RFC 1918 defines three private IPv4 blocks:

10.0.0.0/8

172.16.0.0/12

192.168.0.0/16

Option A exactly matches these ranges in a single source NAT rule, replacing numerous per-subnet entries.

Options B and C contain invalid/non-RFC1918 networks (e.g., 192.16.0.0/12, 172.168.0.0/16).

Option D incorrectly adds documentation network192.0.2.0/24, which is not RFC1918.

When troubleshooting packet handling on an SRX Series device, administrators need to understand exactly how theflow moduleis processing traffic. The most effective tool for this is theflow traceoptions feature.

Flow traceoptions:Provides detailed per-packet trace information showing each processing step within the flow module. It reveals how traffic is evaluated against session tables, NAT rules, and security policies. This is the recommended method for in-depth troubleshooting.

Why not the others?

Theflow session table(Option A) shows only active sessions and counters, not detailed step-by-step handling.

Theforwarding table(Option B) relates to routing and forwarding decisions, not flow security processing.

Firewall filters(Option D) can match and log traffic but do not display detailed flow processing steps.

Therefore, the correct method to get detailed information about flow handling is toenable flow traceoptions.

On high-end SRX platforms, control-plane (Routing Engine–destined) traffic transits the loopback (lo0) and is best captured by applying afirewall filter on lo0 with the then sample action, together withtraffic samplingunder forwarding-options to write packets to a file.

sample sends matched control-plane packets to the sampling process, which can record them for analysis.

datapath-debug capture focuses on data-plane/SPC paths and is not the tool for generic control-plane packet capture.

tcpdump from shell is not the supported workflow on SRX; the operational command is monitor traffic, but forhigh-endcontrol-plane capture, the recommended and scalable method islo0 filter + sampling.

Port mirroring mirrors transit data-plane traffic, not RE-destined control-plane packets.

From the exhibit configuration:

[edit security policies from-zone Trust to-zone Trust]

policy allow-all {

match {

source-address any;

destination-address any;

application any;

}

then {

permit;

}

}

Thefrom-zoneandto-zoneare both set toTrust → Trust.

This means the policy is governing trafficwithin the same zone.

Policies within the same zone are calledintra-zone policies.

Analysis of options:

Global policy (A):Applied universally across zones, not zone-specific. Not the case here.

Inter-zone policy (B):Applies between twodifferentzones (e.g., Trust → Untrust). Not the case here since both zones are Trust.

Intra-zone policy (C):Correct. Applies to traffic within the same zone (Trust → Trust).

Default policy (D):The implicit deny-all policy that applies when no policy matches. Not shown in this exhibit.

Correct Policy Type:Intra-zone policy

From the exhibit, the content filter configuration is as follows:

Match Conditions:

Application:HTTP

Direction:download

File-types:exe

Action:

block

notification log

Analysis of Options:

Option A: Incorrect. The configuration specifies thedownload direction, not upload. Uploads of .exe files are unaffected.

Option B: Correct. Because the rule applies todownloads, .exe files will be blocked when users attempt to download them over HTTP.

Option C: Correct. The notification { log; } statement ensures that an entry will be added to the SRX device’s log when the action is triggered.

Option D: Incorrect. No configuration for sending e-mail notifications is shown in the rule. Only logging is specified.

Correct Statements:B and C

NextGen Web Filtering (NGWF) requires SSL proxy functionality to inspect HTTPS traffic. To enable NGWF:

Option B:You can generate aself-signed certificatefor SSL proxy functionality (or import a CA-signed certificate, but the course emphasizes self-signed for lab/demo purposes).

Option D:You must configure anSSL proxy profileso that HTTPS traffic can be decrypted and inspected.

Option A:A CA-signed certificate may be used in production but is not strictly required to enable NGWF.

Option C:SSL initiation profiles are used for outbound SSL inspection initiated by the SRX, not for NGWF traffic interception.

Correct Actions:Generate a self-signed certificate, Configure an SSL proxy profile

Intra-zone traffic:On SRX devices, traffic between interfaces in the same security zone is allowedwithout requiring a security policy(Option C is correct). Policies are only evaluated for inter-zone traffic.

Junos-host functional zone:This zone is a predefined functional zone that allows administrators to apply policies controlling access to the SRX firewall itself, such as SSH, HTTP, or SNMP traffic (Option D is correct).

Null zone:This zone is a predefined discard zone. Interfaces placed in the null zone drop all traffic. It does not allow policy logging of dropped control plane traffic (Option A is incorrect).

Management functional zone:This is used to define management interfaces, not the “functional zone” as stated in Option B (incorrect wording).

Correct Statements:C and D

Adding interfaces (Option A):An interface must be assigned to a security zone before it can pass traffic. By default, interfaces are in the null zone and cannot send or receive traffic.

Exception traffic (Option B):Security zones define host-inbound-traffic settings, which determine what types of management or control-plane traffic (SSH, ICMP, SNMP) are permitted.

Routing instances (Options C and D):Security zones arespecific to a routing instanceand cannot include interfaces from multiple instances. Therefore, interfaces in the same zone cannot belong to different routing instances.

Correct Statements:A and B

License Requirement (Option B):NextGen Web Filtering (NGWF) is a licensed feature on SRX devices. Without a license, the service cannot operate.

Local vs. Cloud Lists (Option C):NGWF checkslocal block/allow lists first. If the URL does not match locally, the request is then checked against the Juniper cloud database.

Option A:Incorrect, since the cloud is only consulted if the URL is not in the local list.

Option D:Incorrect, as NGWF requires a valid subscription/license.

Correct Statements:NGWF requires a license, and it checks local lists before cloud lookup.

After confirming correct routing:

The next step is toverify security zone assignments (Option A). If interfaces are not correctly assigned to zones, traffic will not be evaluated against proper inter-zone or intra-zone security policies, causing drops.

Option B:The routing protocol is irrelevant once the correct route lookup is confirmed.

Option C:NAT is checked later in the flow, not the immediate next step after routing.

Option D:ALG is only needed for specific applications (FTP, SIP), not general troubleshooting.

Correct Next Step:Verify that interfaces are assigned to the correct security zones.

In Junos OS, NAT rules are evaluated intop-down order. When a new rule is added, it is placed at thebottomof the rule set by default.

To move a rule to the top of the rule set, the command is:

set security nat source rule-set rule top

Option A (top):Correct. Moves the specified rule to the top of the list.

Option B (run):Used to execute operational commands, not rule reordering.

Option C (up):Not valid for reordering NAT rules.

Option D (insert):Not a supported NAT reordering command in Junos.

Correct Command:top

Security policies in Junos OS match traffic based on specific criteria:

Source and destination addresses(Option B).

Application(Option D), which may be defined as services (e.g., tcp/80) or recognized through AppID.

Other options:

MAC addresses(Option A) are not used in policy matching; policies operate at Layer 3/4.

Interface name(Option C) is used in firewall filters, not in security policy definitions.

Correct Criteria:Source address and Applications

The SRX Series devices support third-party antivirus scanning engines such asAvira. To use the Avira antivirus engine, administrators must explicitly enable the engine and ensure that the required components are properly loaded.

Enable in configuration mode:

The Avira antivirus engine must be enabled under UTM configuration mode. This step ensures the SRX device uses the Avira scanning engine for antivirus inspection.

Example:

set security utm feature-profile anti-virus avira-engine enable

Reboot the SRX device:

A system reboot is required after enabling the Avira engine to load the Avira antivirus components into memory.

Without a reboot, the Avira engine will not become active.

Why not the others?

Restarting themgdprocess (Option A) only reloads the management daemon and does not load antivirus engines.

Enabling inoperational mode(Option B) is not supported; the configuration must be applied in configuration mode.

Therefore, the correct actions to use Avira Antivirus are:Enable the Avira engine in configuration mode (Option D) and reboot the SRX device (Option C).

Source NAT (Network Address Translation) is used on SRX devices to allow hosts with private IP addresses to access external networks, such as the Internet. The SRX translates theprivate IP address of the source host into a public IP addressbefore forwarding traffic toward the destination.

It does not translate MAC addresses (Option A).

NAT is unidirectional in this case: it specifically translates private-to-public in the outbound direction, while the reverse (return traffic) is handled automatically through the session table. It is not a bidirectional translation (Option C).

NAT processing occurs as part of the flow module, not limited only to ingress traffic (Option D).

Therefore, the correct statement is that source NAT translatesprivate IP addresses to public IP addresses.

Exception traffic refers to traffic that must be sent from thePacket Forwarding Engine (PFE) to the Routing Engine (RE)for processing, such as routing protocol updates, management traffic, and control-plane destined packets.

Option B:Correct. Exception traffic is rate-limited on the internal connection between the PFE and RE to protect the Routing Engine from denial-of-service attacks.

Option A:Incorrect. Exception traffic is not handled only on the PFE; it requires RE involvement.

Option C:Incorrect. Rejected traffic by security policies is simply dropped, not classified as exception traffic.

Option D:Incorrect. Malformed packets are dropped, not considered exception traffic.

Correct Statement:Exception traffic is rate-limited between the PFE and RE.

In Junos OS, security zones are the foundation of SRX firewall policy enforcement. Logical interfaces must be assigned to zones. This enables:

Separation of traffic by zone boundaries.

Enforcement ofsecurity policiesfor traffic traversing between zones.

Control of traffic across VLANs, subnets, or functional areas (e.g., trust, untrust, DMZ).

Other options:

Zone assignment is not used to simplify interface configuration (A).

Routing protocols and updates (B) are handled by routing instances, not zones.

SNMP monitoring (D) is enabled under system or services configuration, not zones.