Cyber AB CMMC-CCA Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

External connections are defined as connections crossing the OSC’s assessment boundary. Here:

The dedicated VPN from office to cloud = one external connection.

The user-initiated VPNs from remote laptops to cloud = a second external connection.

Extract:

“External connections include all system interfaces that cross the assessment boundary, including VPNs initiated by users or established between sites.”

Thus, there are two external connections.

The Physical Protection (PE) practices require both direct assessor observation of security controls and verification of how the OSC manages access to its cages/cabinets.

Extract:

“Assessors should observe and verify the effectiveness of physical access controls and confirm the OSC’s processes for maintaining control over restricted areas and assets.”

Thus, the best option is to physically visit the facility and review OSC’s key access management process.

Under AT.L2-3.2.3 (Security Awareness Training) and AT.L2-3.2.2 (Insider Threat Training), insider threat awareness training must equip personnel to recognize and report indicators of insider threat activity. Training must focus on organizational processes for reporting suspicious behavior, not just awareness of famous cases or punitive systems. The ability to act and report appropriately is the most critical element.

Exact extracts:

“Training includes recognition of potential indicators of insider threat activity and the organizational processes for reporting suspicious activity.”

“Assessment Objectives … Determine if: insider threat training includes reporting mechanisms.”

“Case studies may be used for context, but training must include clear reporting procedures.”

Expanded explanation:

Insider threat programs under DoD guidance (e.g., NISPOM, CMMC) emphasize:

Awareness of behaviors that may indicate insider threat activity.

Reporting mechanisms — employees must know exactly how to act if they identify an issue.

Procedures for escalation and protection of CUI.

Without reporting procedures, insider threat training is incomplete.

Why other options are incorrect:

A: Bounty systems are not sanctioned practices and could create a hostile work environment.

B: Risk-ranking individuals could be discriminatory and is not a CMMC requirement.

C: Case studies may supplement training but are not sufficient by themselves.