Cyber AB CMMC-CCA Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

If an asset processes or generates CUI, it is a CUI Asset by definition, regardless of whether it is also part of a test lab or claimed as a Specialized Asset. Specialized Asset handling applies only when the asset does not process, store, or transmit CUI. Since the workstation outputs CUI, it must be assessed fully against CMMC practices.

Exact extracts:

“CUI Assets are those that process, store, or transmit CUI.”

“Specialized Assets… do not process, store, or transmit CUI.”

“If a Specialized Asset processes CUI, it must be categorized as a CUI Asset and is assessed against all applicable practices.”

Why the other options are incorrect:

B: The issue is not with the SSP practice; it is with misclassification of an asset.

C/D: Risk-based treatment applies only to Specialized Assets without CUI, which is not the case here.

CMMC requires that remote maintenance sessions be terminated after use or after a defined period of inactivity. This ensures third-party maintenance access does not remain open and uncontrolled, preventing unauthorized persistence.

Exact Extracts:

MA.L2-3.7.5: “Require multifactor authentication and terminate remote maintenance sessions after each session or after a defined period of inactivity.”

Assessment Guide clarifies: “Assessors should confirm remote maintenance sessions are automatically terminated using technical means.”

NIST SP 800-171A Objective: “Test maintenance session termination after a set time of inactivity or completion of task.”

Why other options are not correct:

A: Limiting maintenance to third parties only is not a requirement. Internal staff may also perform maintenance.

B: Identification and monitoring are important, but the specific control required here is termination of remote sessions.

C: Limiting the number of personnel is not mandated by CMMC.

Under AT.L2-3.2.3 (Security Awareness Training) and AT.L2-3.2.2 (Insider Threat Training), insider threat awareness training must equip personnel to recognize and report indicators of insider threat activity. Training must focus on organizational processes for reporting suspicious behavior, not just awareness of famous cases or punitive systems. The ability to act and report appropriately is the most critical element.

Exact extracts:

“Training includes recognition of potential indicators of insider threat activity and the organizational processes for reporting suspicious activity.”

“Assessment Objectives … Determine if: insider threat training includes reporting mechanisms.”

“Case studies may be used for context, but training must include clear reporting procedures.”

Expanded explanation:

Insider threat programs under DoD guidance (e.g., NISPOM, CMMC) emphasize:

Awareness of behaviors that may indicate insider threat activity.

Reporting mechanisms — employees must know exactly how to act if they identify an issue.

Procedures for escalation and protection of CUI.

Without reporting procedures, insider threat training is incomplete.

Why other options are incorrect:

A: Bounty systems are not sanctioned practices and could create a hostile work environment.

B: Risk-ranking individuals could be discriminatory and is not a CMMC requirement.

C: Case studies may supplement training but are not sufficient by themselves.